译者 | 王子铭 西北政法大学 

一审 | peipei 布里斯托大学

二审 | LYJ  NUS LLM

编辑 | 邓子容 中国人民大学

        王明明 南京大学

责编 | 邱   怡 上海交通大学

案件编号：CV 24-9033-GW-RAOx

日期：2025年4月4日

案件名称：

爱尔康娱乐有限责任公司诉特斯拉公司等

出席人员：

主审法官：乔治·H·吴

（美国联邦地区法院法官）

副书记官：哈维尔·冈萨雷斯

无其他出席人员

法庭书记员/记录员：缺席

磁带编号：缺席

原告代理律师：缺席

被告代理律师：缺席

PROCEEDINGS:

IN CHAMBERS - TENTATIVE RULINGS ON DEFENDANTS TESLA,

INC. AND ELON MUSK'S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT; and DEFENDANT WARNER BROS. DISCOVERY,

INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Attached hereto is the Court’s Tentative Rulings on Defendants’ Motions, set for hearing on April 7, 2025 at 8:30 a.m.

诉讼程序：非公开审理——就被告特斯拉公司、埃隆·马斯克针对第一次修正起诉状提出的驳回起诉动议，以及被告华纳兄弟探索公司针对第一次修正起诉状提出的驳回起诉动议作出临时裁决

(本文件附件为法院针对被告动议的临时裁决，该案定于2025年4月7日上午8:30举行听证会。)

Alcon Entm’t, LLC v. Tesla, Inc., et al., Case No. 2:24-cv-9033-GW-(RAOx) Tentative rulings on: 1) Defendants Tesla, Inc. and Elon Musk’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, and 2) Defendant Warner Bros. Discovery, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint

爱尔康娱乐有限责任公司诉特斯拉公司等，

案件编号：2:24-cv-09033-GW-(RAOx)

临时裁决涉及事项：

1）被告特斯拉公司、埃隆·马斯克针对第一次修正起诉状的驳回起诉动议；

2）被告华纳兄弟探索公司针对第一次修正起诉状的驳回起诉动议

I. Background

一、背景

Alcon Entertainment, LLC (“Plaintiff”) has sued Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”), Elon Musk (“Musk”), and Warner Bros. Discovery, Inc. (“Warner” and, together with Tesla and Musk, “Defendants”) due to events occurring in connection with promotion efforts involving Tesla’s planned “cybercab” product at, and using, Warner’s facility/ies. In partial response to earlier-filed motions to dismiss, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on February 13, 2025. The FAC contains four claims for relief: 1) direct copyright infringement [17 U.S.C. § 501]; 2) vicarious copyright infringement [17 U.S.C. § 501]; 3) contributory copyright infringement [17 U.S.C. § 501]; and 4) false affiliation and/or false endorsement [15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)]. Defendants now move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss the FAC with prejudice, with one motion filed on behalf of Tesla and Musk, and another filed on Warner’s behalf.

原告爱尔康娱乐有限责任公司（以下简称“原告”）起诉被告特斯拉公司（以下简称“特斯拉”）、埃隆·马斯克（以下简称“马斯克”）及华纳兄弟探索公司（以下简称“华纳”，与特斯拉、马斯克合称“被告方”），事由涉及特斯拉计划推出的“赛博出租车”产品在华纳场地进行且利用华纳场地资源开展的推广活动相关事件。针对被告方此前提出的驳回起诉动议，原告于2025年2月13日提交了第一次修正起诉状（“FAC起诉状”）。该FAC起诉状包含四项救济请求：1）直接版权侵权【《美国法典》第17编第501条】；2）替代版权侵权【《美国法典》第17编第501条】；3）帮助性版权侵权【《美国法典》第17编第501条】；4）虚假关联和/或虚假背书【《美国法典》第15编第1125(a)(1)(A)条】。被告方依据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第12(b)(6)条，分别以特斯拉与马斯克为共同申请人、华纳为单独申请人，提出动议，请求对FAC起诉状作出有既判力的驳回。

Plaintiff is an independent motion picture and television studio that produced the motion picture “Blade Runner 2049” (“BR2049”), and that “owns the BR2049 [registered] copyright and the BR2049 marks and brand at issue in this action.” Among other things, BR2049 “features a strikinglydesigned, artificially intelligent, fully autonomous car throughout the story.”

原告系独立影视制片公司，制作了电影《银翼杀手2049》（简称“BR2049”），并“拥有本案所涉的BR2049（已注册）版权及BR2049商标与品牌权益”。BR2049的核心元素之一是“整部影片中贯穿始终的一款设计独特、具备人工智能的全自动驾驶汽车”。

According to Plaintiff, Musk – Tesla’s “founder, largest shareholder and Chief Executive Officer,” id. ¶ 33 – and Tesla “wanted to leverage BR2049 to advertise cars, specifically including BR2049’s main character and the film’s iconic ‘Las Vegas Sequence.’” This particularly concerned an October 10, 2024 presentation at what was described as a “We Robot” event held (as part of a “highly lucrative deal”) at Warner’s Burbank, California studio lot.

据原告称，特斯拉的“创始人、最大股东及首席执行官”马斯克（参见FAC起诉状第33段）与特斯拉“希望借助BR2049推广汽车产品，特别是利用该片的主角及影片中标志性的‘拉斯维加斯场景’”。此事与2024年10月10日在华纳位于加利福尼亚州伯班克的制片厂场地举办的“我们·机器人”（作为“高利润交易”的一部分）上的一场发布会密切相关。

Plaintiff alleges, on information and belief, that Tesla and Warner (or a Warner subsidiary “as the nominal contracting party, but with Warner in fact actively supervising and directing decision making about the relevant facts”) entered into a contract “the essence of which” included Warner (or nominally a Warner subsidiary) leasing or licensing or otherwise providing studio lot space, lot access, infrastructure support and other resources to Tesla for the October 10, 2024 event.

原告据信主张，特斯拉与华纳（或华纳旗下某子公司作为名义签约方，但华纳实际积极监督和指导与相关事实相关的决策）签订了一份合同，该合同的核心内容包括华纳（或名义上的华纳子公司）向特斯拉出租、许可或以其他方式提供制片厂场地、场地使用权、基础设施支持及其他资源，用于2024年10月10日的活动。

Again on information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that the Tesla-Warner contractual relationship “included a promotional element or elements, whereby Musk and Tesla expected to be able to affiliate the cybercab with one or more motion pictures from Warner’s motion picture library,” or the library of its subsidiary, which was the domestic distributor for Plaintiff for the 2017 theatrical release of BR2049. See id. ¶¶ 8687. But neither Warner’s subsidiary nor any other Warner entity has or ever had sufficient rights to allow Tesla to exploit BR2049 or any of its elements, or any of Plaintiff’s marks or goodwill, in connection with the globally livestreamed event at issue here.

原告进一步据信主张，特斯拉与华纳的合同关系“包含一项或多项推广要素，据此马斯克与特斯拉期望能够将赛博出租车与华纳（或其一家子公司）电影库中的一部或多部电影相关联”——该子公司是原告2017年BR2049院线发行的美国国内发行商。参见同起诉状第86-87段。但无论是华纳子公司还是其他任何华纳关联实体，均未拥有、且从未拥有允许特斯拉在本案所涉的全球直播活动中利用BR2049或其任何元素、或原告的任何商标及商誉的充分权利。

On information and belief, Musk specifically wanted to associate the cybercab and Tesla with BR2049. Also on information and belief, Tesla and Musk asked Warner (or one or more of Warner’s subsidiaries’ employees who were being “actively managed and directed by” Warner on “event issues”) for permission and rights to use the image attached to the FAC as Exhibit A. See id. ¶ 90 & n.5; Docket No. 37-1. Yet, no one ever contacted Plaintiff about the brand affiliation proposal (or even a “clip license” proposal), and Plaintiff only learned of Defendants’ interest in BR2049 on the day of the event, six hours prior to its scheduled commencement.

基于所知所信，马斯克明确希望将赛博出租车及特斯拉与BR2049相关联。原告还据信主张，特斯拉与马斯克请求华纳（或受华纳就“活动相关事宜”积极管理和指导的华纳子公司员工）允许其使用FAC起诉状附件A中的图像。参见同起诉状第90段及注释5；案卷编号37-1。然而，从未有任何一方就品牌合作提议联系过原告（甚至未提及“片段许可”提议），原告直至活动当天、距活动预定开始时间仅6小时才知晓被告方有意使用BR2049。

Notwithstanding Defendants’ desire to be able to make use of BR2049, Plaintiff refused them permission to use a still image from BR2049, the image attached as Exhibit A to the FAC. Plaintiff was specific in its communications with certain executives handling licensing attempts/efforts – with a request to relay this position to Warner, Tesla and X (a request that was reportedly honored) – that “under no circumstances should there be any BR2049 affiliation, or any other Plaintiff affiliation, express or implied, with Tesla, X, Musk or any Musk-owned company in the course of the October 10, 2024 event, or ever.” FAC ¶ 96; see also id. ¶¶ 3, 17 (alleging that, prior to the “We Robot” event, Plaintiff “adamantly objected to Defendants suggesting any affiliation whatsoever between BR2049 or Plaintiff on the one hand, and Tesla, Musk or any Musk-owned company, on the other,” explaining that, beyond “ordinary commercial issues,” Plaintiff specifically did not want any association with Musk, considering his “massively amplified, highly politicized, capricious and arbitrary behavior, which sometimes veers into hate speech”). On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that, once informed that Plaintiff would not accede to Tesla’s and Musk’s desires, Warner “either effectively blessed Musk and Tesla to incorporate BR2049 in the event anyway, and/or failed to take meaningful action to stop them, although such action was available.”

尽管被告方希望使用BR2049，原告仍拒绝其使用BR2049的静态图像（即FAC起诉状附件A中的图像）。原告向负责许可洽谈的部分高管明确表示（并要求其将该立场转达给华纳、特斯拉及X平台——据称该要求已得到执行）：“在2024年10月10日的活动中，或在任何情况下，均不得出现任何BR2049与特斯拉、X平台、马斯克或任何马斯克旗下公司之间的关联，也不得出现原告与上述主体之间的任何明示或暗示的关联”。FAC起诉状第96段；另参见同起诉状第3、17段（原告主张在“机器人大会”活动前，其已“坚决反对被告关于BR2049（或原告自身）与特斯拉、马斯克或任何马斯克旗下公司之间存在关联的暗示”，并解释称，除“普通商业事务”外，原告特别不愿与马斯克产生任何关联，因其“行为被高度放大、极具政治化、反复无常且专断任性，有时甚至涉及仇恨言论”）。原告据信主张，在被告方知晓原告拒绝满足特斯拉与马斯克的诉求后，华纳“要么实际上默许马斯克与特斯拉在活动中纳入BR2049相关元素，和/或未采取可行的有效措施阻止其行为”。

In contrast with the practice of what it describes as “responsible car makers and ad agencies,” the FAC asserts that Musk and Tesla “borrowed the storytelling power” of the film anyway by way of their use of a slide at the “We Robot” event (a screenshot of which is attached to the FAC as Exhibit C), “displaying the slide full screen for 11 seconds on the global livestream feed as their presentation opener.” Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 5, 18; see also id. ¶ 6 (alleging that Musk “wanted to borrow the storytelling power and expression of [BR2049] to sell cars and the car company”); id. ¶ 7 (alleging misappropriation of BR2049’s “storytelling power” and BR2049 and Plaintiff’s “brand goodwill to advertise, market and sell Tesla’s automobiles and Tesla as a company”); Docket No. 37-3. Musk and Tesla made use of artificial intelligence (“AI”) to create the slide employed during the event. See FAC ¶¶ 2-3, 5; see also id. ¶¶ 103-04. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Musk and Tesla created “their own near-photo-realistic illustration” of the android main character from BR2049, named “K”, “exploring the ruined Las Vegas.

与原告所称的“负责任的汽车制造商及广告公司”的做法不同，FAC起诉状主张，马斯克与特斯拉仍通过在“机器人大会”活动中使用某一幻灯片（该幻灯片的截图作为FAC起诉状附件C附上）“借用了影片的叙事影响力”，并“在全球直播中全屏展示该幻灯片长达11秒，作为其发布会的开场”。同起诉状第2-3、5、18段；另参见同起诉状第6段（原告主张马斯克“希望借用BR2049的叙事影响力及表达形式推广汽车及汽车公司”）；同起诉状第7段（主张其盗用了BR2049的“叙事影响力”及BR2049与原告的“品牌商誉，以宣传、营销和销售特斯拉的汽车及特斯拉公司”）；案卷编号37-3。马斯克与特斯拉利用人工智能（AI）制作了活动中使用的该幻灯片。参见FAC起诉状第2-3、5段；另参见同起诉状第103-104段。具体而言，原告主张马斯克与特斯拉创作了“他们自己的近乎照片级真实感的插画”，描绘了BR2049中的人造人主角“K”在“探索荒芜的拉斯维加斯”的场景。

The event began with a Tesla representative taking the stage to note that the presentation “was being made from the Warner Bros. lot, the home of many science fiction films that show visions of the future,” before explaining “that the event would involve Tesla showing a vision of the future, and who better than Musk to do it.” Id. ¶ 99. Once he arrived at the exact scene of the presentation (after being delivered there, through the streets of Warner’s lot, by a cybercab), the FAC alleges (accurately, as confirmed by the Court’s review of the presentation) Musk said: “So you see a lot of scifi movies where the future is dark and dismal, where it’s not a future you want to be in.” Id. ¶ 101. The livestream feed then shifted to a slide with an image of the Earth and the words “What Kind of World Do We Want to Live In?” Id.

活动开场时，一名特斯拉代表登台表示，此次发布会“在华纳兄弟制片厂场地举行——这里诞生了众多描绘未来愿景的科幻电影”，随后解释称“本次活动将展示特斯拉对未来的愿景，而由马斯克来呈现这一愿景再合适不过”。同起诉状第99段³。马斯克乘坐赛博出租车穿过华纳制片厂的街道抵达发布会现场后，FAC起诉状主张（经法院审查发布会内容确认属实），马斯克称：“你们看过很多科幻电影，其中的未来往往黑暗而凄凉，并非我们所向往的未来。”同起诉状第101段。随后，直播画面切换至一张展示地球图像的幻灯片，上面配有文字“我们希望生活在什么样的世界？”同段。

After two seconds showing that slide, the livestream changed to a second slide, which would ultimately be displayed for about 11 seconds. Plaintiff describes this second slide as appearing at first “like a motion picture still photo (although it isn’t)” displaying “a male figure seen from behind, with close-cropped hair, wearing a trench coat or duster, standing in almost full silhouette as he surveys the abandoned ruins of a city, all bathed in misty orange light.” The words “Not This” appear in the upper-left corner, superimposed on part of the orange sky.

该幻灯片展示两秒后，直播切换至第二张幻灯片，该幻灯片最终展示时长约11秒。原告描述该第二张幻灯片初看“如同电影静态剧照（尽管实际并非如此）”，呈现“一名男性背影，短发，身着风衣，近乎全身剪影，站立在废弃的城市废墟前眺望，整个场景笼罩在朦胧的橙色光线中”。左上角叠加有“不是这个”字样，覆盖在部分橙色天空背景上。

During the 11-second display of this image, Musk added – according to the FAC (almost word-for-word correctly) – voiceover comments, saying “You know, I love ‘Blade Runner,’ but I don’t know if we want that future. I believe we want that duster he’s wearing, but not the, uh, not the bleak apocalypse.” The FAC elsewhere characterizes Musk’s voiceover accompanying the presentation as having “clearly identified the image as an illustration of the ‘Blade Runner’ movie set in a world which has suffered a ‘bleak apocalypse,’ where ‘he’ (meaning the particular blade runner in question) is wearing a ‘duster’ (trench coat) while he surveys the distinctly orange-lit ruins of a city in the apocalyptic space,” a description which the FAC asserts “only matches a single motion picture in all of Hollywood, or anywhere else: BR2049.” The FAC also asserts that “there is also only one blade runner character that fits that description: K.” Id.

在该图像展示的11秒内，FAC起诉状称（与实际表述几乎完全一致），马斯克进行了画外音解说：“你们知道，我喜欢《银翼杀手》，但我不确定我们是否想要那样的未来。我觉得我们可能喜欢他穿的那件风衣，但不想要那个……凄凉的末日场景。”FAC起诉状还指出，马斯克在发布会中的画外音“明确将该图像标识为《银翼杀手》电影中的场景——该电影设定在一个经历了‘凄凉末日’的世界，其中‘他’（指所涉的银翼杀手）身着‘风衣’，在末日背景下笼罩于独特橙色光线的城市废墟中眺望”，并主张该描述“在好莱坞乃至全球范围内仅对应一部电影：BR2049”。FAC起诉状还主张，“符合该描述的银翼杀手角色也仅有一个：K”。

Plaintiff asserts that Musk’s reference to “Blade Runner” in his voiceover was “clearly specifically meant to evoke BR2049 rather than the original 1982 Picture,” at least in part because Plaintiff believes the context and worldwide goodwill of BR2049 is much more relevant – in part due to “artificially intelligent autonomous cars like the Tesla cybercab being pitched at the event” – to Tesla’s and Musk’s aims than is the original “Blade Runner” film. Plaintiff believes that the presentation’s second slide was intended “to read visually either as an actual still image from BR2049’s iconic sequence of K exploring the ruined Las Vegas,” or as a “minimally stylized copy of or illustration of such a still image,” or “otherwise as an illustration of a scene from BR2049 and specifically its Las Vegas Sequence.” It takes the position that the slide “does in fact objectively read like one or all of these,” and was likely created with the assistance of an AI image generator, on information and belief making specific reference to K and the Las Vegas Sequence of BR2049 and/or “to add ‘Elon Musk in a duster in the foreground,’ or similar direction.”

原告主张，马斯克在画外音中提及“银翼杀手”，“显然旨在唤起观众对BR2049的联想，而非1982年的原版电影”，部分原因在于原告认为，鉴于“活动中推广的特斯拉赛博出租车等人工智能自动驾驶汽车”，BR2049的背景及全球商誉与特斯拉和马斯克的目标更为相关，而非原版《银翼杀手》电影。原告认为，发布会的第二张幻灯片旨在“从视觉上让观众认为其要么是BR2049中K探索荒芜拉斯维加斯的标志性场景的实际静态图像，要么是该静态图像的轻度风格化复制或插画，要么是以其他方式呈现的BR2049中的场景，特别是其拉斯维加斯场景”。原告主张该幻灯片“实际上客观上符合上述一种或所有描述”，且据信是在人工智能图像生成器的协助下创作的，生成时明确提及了BR2049中的K及拉斯维加斯场景，和/或“要求在前景中加入‘身着风衣的埃隆·马斯克’或类似表述”。

Plaintiff further asserts, on information and belief, that the slide was generated “by an employee or agent of one or more of Warner, Tesla ..., or even possibly by Musk himself.” It also alleges that “all of the Defendants participated in its creation, and in its display in the presentation at the event, from a Warner-owned building and studio lot, on Warner-owned video screens, and otherwise using Warner owned technology infrastructure.” Alternatively, any defendants who did not so actively participate still “ratified the conduct and knowingly accepted the benefits of it.” Id. In addition, according to the FAC, Warner “actively monitored . . ., supervised . . ., and ultimately controlled . . . and directed” the “We Robot” event, “at the very least as to the disputed matters that are the subject of” the FAC. However, as part of the “We Robot” event, it was “difficult and problematic” for Warner “to keep Musk bounded by well-established rules of the business,” “ultimately fail[ing] to do so when it could have.” Id. ¶ 18.

原告进一步据信主张，该幻灯片由“华纳、特斯拉等一方或多方的员工或代理人创作，甚至可能由马斯克本人创作”。原告还主张，“所有被告均参与了该幻灯片的创作，以及在活动发布会中的展示——发布会举办地为华纳所有的建筑及制片厂场地，使用的是华纳所有的视频屏幕，并通过华纳所有的技术基础设施进行传播”。同段⁷。或者，未积极参与上述行为的被告仍“追认了该行为，并明知而接受了该行为带来的利益”。此外，根据FAC起诉状，华纳“积极监控、监督并最终控制和指导”了“机器人大会”活动，“至少在FAC起诉状所涉的争议事项方面是如此”。然而，在“机器人大会”活动中，华纳“难以且未能成功约束马斯克遵守业内既定规则”，“最终在本可阻止的情况下未能阻止其违规行为”。同起诉状第18段。

Tesla, Musk and others re-posted the “We Robot” livestream, including the “BR2049-infused opening,” thousands of times, with millions of total views, such that the false affiliation between Plaintiff, BR2049, Tesla and Musk “is irreparably entangled in the global media tapestry.”

特斯拉、马斯克及其他主体将“机器人大会”的直播内容（包括融入BR2049元素的开场部分）进行了数千次的转发，总观看次数达数百万次，导致原告、BR2049与特斯拉、马斯克之间的虚假关联“不可挽回地融入了全球媒体环境”。

Exhibits A and B to the FAC “are examples of ‘still images’ from BR2049,” but Plaintiff acknowledges that it is BR2049 itself that is the subject of the registered copyright and alleged “infringed work” at issue in this case. However, Plaintiff’s theory in the FAC is that, “for instances of copying that go beyond literal copying or bodily appropriation of protected elements, identification of protected elements of BR2049 has to involve some level of consideration of the entire Picture, including its plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events.” Thus, in Plaintiff’s view, still images, “especially if from qualitatively important scenes or sequences,” are themselves protected elements of the BR2049 copyright. In fact, they are “also more than just protected elements of BR2049 that can be looked at alone: they are effective vehicles for quickly evoking other protected elements of BR2049 to the audience,” like the film’s plot, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events,” “even if those elements cannot be visually identified directly in the still image in question.” According to Plaintiff, this is also true of “an infringing work that looks like it is or might be a still image from BR2049, ... especially if such an emulated image is openly characterized by the presenter as meant to be a still from or illustration of BR2049 or protected elements of its story (as happened here).”

FAC起诉状的附件A和附件B是“BR2049中的静态图像示例”，但原告承认，本案所涉的注册版权及被主张的“侵权作品”的核心是BR2049影片本身。然而，原告在FAC起诉状中的主张是：“对于超出字面复制或对受保护元素的完整挪用的复制行为，识别BR2049的受保护元素需要在一定程度上结合影片整体进行考量，包括其情节、主题、对白、氛围、场景、节奏、角色及事件顺序”。因此，在原告看来，静态图像（“尤其是来自关键场景或片段的静态图像”）本身就是BR2049版权的受保护元素。事实上，它们“不仅是BR2049中可单独审视的受保护元素：它们还是向观众快速唤起BR2049其他受保护元素（如影片的情节、主题、对白、氛围、场景、节奏、角色及事件顺序）的有效载体”，“即使这些元素无法在相关静态图像中直接通过视觉识别”。原告称，对于“看似是或可能是BR2049静态图像的侵权作品……尤其是当发布者明确表示该模仿图像旨在作为BR2049的静态图像或插画（本案即属此种情况）时”，上述结论同样成立。

Musk and Tesla allegedly directly-infringed Plaintiff’s reproduction right via “literal copying of the entirety of BR2049 or of protectable elements of BR2049 such as still images like those in Exhibits A and B to the FAC, or a partial videorecording of BR2049, to an AI image generator” or by “literal copying of an unauthorized derivative work ... which itself was generated by literal copying of the entirety of BR2049 or of protectable elements of BR2049 such as still images like those in Exhibits A and B to the FAC, or a partial videorecording of BR2049, to an AI image generator. They also allegedly violated Plaintiff’s right to prepare derivative works, with the second slide from the “We Robot” presentation impermissibly incorporating a host of allegedly protected elements of BR2049. They also allegedly violated Plaintiff’s right to display BR2049 publicly. Plaintiff also asserts that Warner is a direct infringer of Plaintiff’s public display rights with the presentation having been “conducted on, and transmitted over, Warner-owned or Warner-controlled property, infrastructure and systems.”

原告主张，马斯克与特斯拉通过以下方式直接侵犯了原告的复制权：“将BR2049的全部内容、或其受保护元素（如FAC起诉状附件A和附件B中的静态图像）、或BR2049的部分视频片段，字面复制至人工智能图像生成器”或“将未经授权的演绎作品（该演绎作品本身是经字面复制生成，即通过将BR2049的全部内容或其受保护元素，如FAC起诉状附件A和附件B中的静态图像或BR2049的部分视频片段字面复制至人工智能图像生成器后生成”。原告还主张，两人侵犯了其制作演绎作品的权利，因“机器人大会”发布会的第二张幻灯片非法纳入了BR2049的多项据称受保护的元素。原告还主张，两人侵犯了其公开展示BR2049的权利。原告另主张，华纳直接侵犯了其公开展示权，因该发布会“在华纳所有或控制的财产、基础设施及系统上举行并传播”。

If Defendants are not each liable for direct copyright infringement, Plaintiff asserts that they are each vicariously liable for the direct infringements committed by “individual agents, contractors, or other infringers presently unknown,” because they each had the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity. As to Tesla and Musk, those defendants could have refrained from creating the presentation slide in question or including it in the “We Robot” presentation. As to Warner, Plaintiff alleges that it used “its shared services licensing department to perform clearance work for the presentation” and thus, on information and belief, it “had the right and ability to tell the Direct Infringers that their infringing conduct was not acceptable and could not be part of the presentation.” This is especially the case if the “direct infringers” were “individual agents, employees or contractors of Warner, or of one or more subsidiaries of Warner over which Warner exercised actual or practical control.”

若被告方均不构成直接版权侵权，原告主张其均应对“目前身份不明的个人代理人、承包商或其他侵权人的直接侵权行为承担替代责任”，因其均拥有监督侵权行为的权利和能力。就特斯拉与马斯克而言，该两名被告本可避免创作所涉幻灯片或避免将其纳入“机器人大会”发布会。就华纳而言，原告主张其“曾通过共享服务许可部门为发布会进行权利核查工作”，因此据信其“有权且有能力告知直接侵权人其行为构成侵权，且不得将侵权元素纳入发布会内容”。若“直接侵权人”是“华纳的个人代理人、员工或承包商，或华纳实际或事实上控制的一家子公司或多家子公司的个人代理人、员工或承包商”，则情况尤为如此。

Musk and Tesla obtained direct financial benefit from the infringement by virtue of the infringing material constituting part of the draw they intentionally used “to sell cars and the Company,” increasing consumer interest in Tesla cybercabs, leading to selling more of them or receiving more pre-orders for them.  As to Warner, on information and belief, Musk and Tesla’s belief that they could use one or more Hollywood motion picture properties – including BR2049 – at no extra meaningful charge – in contrast to the ordinary 6- to 8-figure charge – was part of the draw for Musk and Tesla to agree to make the payments that Tesla contracted to make to Warner for the event. Plaintiff also alleges, on information and belief, that Warner had a financial incentive to avoid any claims of breach of contract or adjustment of contract price when Musk/Tesla learned they would not be able to achieve the desired brand affiliation.

马斯克与特斯拉从侵权行为中获得了直接经济利益，因侵权材料是其有意用于“推广汽车及公司”的吸引点，提高了消费者对特斯拉赛博出租车的兴趣，进而促进了汽车的销售或预订量。就华纳而言，原告据信主张，马斯克与特斯拉认为其无需支付额外的巨额费用（通常为6至8位数）即可使用包括BR2049在内的一部或多部好莱坞电影资产，这是吸引马斯克与特斯拉同意向华纳支付活动相关合同款项的因素之一。原告还据信主张，当马斯克/特斯拉得知其无法实现期望的品牌关联时，华纳有经济动机避免面临违约索赔或合同价款调整的风险。

In addition to direct and vicarious infringement theories, Plaintiff also lodges a contributory infringement theory. It asserts that Tesla and Musk intentionally included Exhibit C in the presentation and could plainly see that it was not an actual still image from BR2049 but rather a stylized copy that would likely be found infringing. Those defendants also knew that Plaintiff had refused permission. In its use of its shared services licensing department, Plaintiff asserts on information and belief that Warner was at least being shown image options, including Exhibit C, in advance of the event. Musk and Tesla materially contributed to the infringement by including Exhibit C in the presentation. Warner materially contributed to it because the event display, distribution and public performance aspects of the infringement occurred at its studio lot, and with the use and support of its facilities and technology. See id. Also on information and belief, Plaintiff asserts that Warner induced the infringement by convincing or encouraging the direct infringers, Tesla and Musk, that Plaintiff’s denial of permission “could be circumvented by generation and use of an AIgenerated copy of iconic BR2049 imagery.”

除直接侵权和替代侵权主张外，原告还提出了帮助性侵权的主张。原告主张，特斯拉与马斯克故意将附件C纳入发布会，且明知该图像并非BR2049的实际静态图像，而是可能被认定为侵权的风格化复制件。该两名被告还知晓原告已拒绝许可。原告据信主张，华纳通过其共享服务许可部门，至少在活动前已收到包括附件C在内的图像备选方案。马斯克与特斯拉通过将附件C纳入发布会，对侵权行为提供了实质性帮助。华纳则因侵权行为的发布会展示、传播及公开表演均在其制片厂场地进行，并利用了其设施和技术，因此对侵权行为提供了实质性帮助。参见同段。原告还据信主张，华纳通过说服或鼓励直接侵权人特斯拉与马斯克，使其认为原告的许可拒绝“可通过生成和使用人工智能创作的BR2049标志性图像复制品来规避”，从而诱导了侵权行为。

For purposes of its Lanham Act claim, Plaintiff alleges that it owns an unregistered trademark in the words “Blade Runner 2049,” which it asserts is “broad enough to include the words ‘Blade Runner’ in contexts that refer to or include BR2049 (such as, for example, the words ‘Blade Runner’ not followed by the number ‘2049,’ but alongside iconic images from BR2049, or other callouts to specific scenes or elements of BR2049).” It also asserts that “still images from iconic scenes in BR2049, and audiovisual clips of iconic scenes from BR2049” also serve as “trade dress.” Also included as an unregistered mark and/or protectable trade dress, according to Plaintiff’s allegations, are “the character ‘K,’ including descriptions of K, and visual images that look like or evoke the character K, and/or that are held out to be the character K, either explicitly or implicitly.” Finally, Plaintiff asserts that it has “a protectable Lanham Act interest (mark, brand or trade dress)” in “combinations of elements which evoke or tend to evoke BR2049 in the eyes of the ordinary consumer,” including “showing an image like Exhibit C to the FAC with an accompanying voiceover discussing a ‘post-apocalyptic’ ‘Blade Runner’ movie, especially in an overall context of robots (replicants are sometimes recognized as a variation of robots) and artificially intelligent, semi-autonomous or wholly autonomous cars.”

就《兰哈姆法案》相关请求而言，原告主张其拥有“银翼杀手2049”这一未注册商标权益，该权益“范围广泛，包括在指代或涉及BR2049的语境中使用‘银翼杀手’一词（例如，‘银翼杀手’一词后未跟随数字‘2049’，但与BR2049的标志性图像或其他指向BR2049特定场景或元素的内容一同使用）”。原告还主张，“BR2049标志性场景的静态图像及视听片段”也构成“商业外观”。原告另主张，“角色‘K’（包括对K的描述、看似或唤起K形象的视觉图像、以及明示或暗示被声称是K的视觉图像）”也属于未注册商标和/或受保护的商业外观。最后，原告主张其对“在普通消费者眼中唤起或倾向于唤起BR2049联想的元素组合”享有“受《兰哈姆法案》保护的权益（商标、品牌或商业外观）”，包括“展示类似FAC起诉状附件C的图像，并配以讨论‘后末日时代’‘银翼杀手’电影的画外音，尤其是在涉及机器人（复制人有时被视为机器人的一种）及人工智能、半自动驾驶或完全自动驾驶汽车的整体语境中”。

Plaintiff alleges that Tesla and Musk “have engaged in false representations which are likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection or association of Tesla and Musk with Plaintiff or as to the sponsorship or approval of Tesla’s or Musk’s goods, services, or commercial activities by Plaintiff.” Specifically, Musk and Tesla used or evoked Plaintiff’s BLADE RUNNER 2049 mark, Plaintiff’s mark or protectable goodwill in the character K, Plaintiff’s protectable trade dress in iconic or recognizable still images from BR2049 (such as those attached as Exhibits A and B to the FAC) such that the presentation slide (Exhibit C to the FAC) appeared to be either an actual still image from BR2049 or a lightly-stylized illustration of K about to enter the irradiated Las Vegas, or a protectable combination of the foregoing. According to Plaintiff, the conduct has the effect of falsely representing that Tesla’s and Musk’s goods and services are licensed, sponsored, endorsed, or otherwise authorized by Plaintiff, and/or is at the very least misleading on these points. Plaintiff is informed and believes that discovery will reveal that Warner aided and abetted Tesla’s and Musk’s alleged Lanham Act violations, during or after those violations.

原告主张，特斯拉与马斯克“从事了虚假陈述行为，该行为可能导致消费者混淆、误解或受骗，误以为特斯拉、马斯克与原告存在关联、联系或合作关系，或误以为原告赞助、认可特斯拉或马斯克的商品、服务或商业活动”。具体而言，马斯克与特斯拉使用或唤起了原告的“银翼杀手2049”商标、原告在角色K上的商标权益或受保护商誉、原告在BR2049标志性或可识别静态图像（如FAC起诉状附件A和附件B中的图像）上的受保护商业外观，导致发布会幻灯片（FAC起诉状附件C）看似是BR2049的实际静态图像，或K即将进入受辐射拉斯维加斯的轻度风格化插画，或上述元素的受保护组合。原告称，该行为具有虚假陈述的效果，即特斯拉和马斯克的商品和服务获得了原告的许可、赞助、认可或其他授权，且/或至少在上述方面具有误导性。原告据信主张，通过证据开示将查明，华纳在特斯拉与马斯克的上述据称《兰哈姆法案》侵权行为期间或之后提供了帮助和支持。

Plaintiff asserts that it “has spent decades and hundreds of millions of dollars building the BR2049 brand into the famous mark that it now is.” It further contends that: the words “Blade Runner 2049,” the words “Blade Runner” used in contexts that specifically evoke BR2049 distinct from the original 1982 “Blade Runner” motion picture, visual images or audiovisual presentations which evoke BR2049’s main character “K,” and/or which evoke iconic sequences and settings from BR2049, are all protected marks and trade dress with secondary meaning.

原告声称，其“花费了数十年时间和数亿美元，将BR2049品牌打造成如今的知名商标”。原告进一步主张：“‘银翼杀手2049’一词、在特定语境中使用以明确唤起BR2049（区别于1982年原版《银翼杀手》电影）联想的‘银翼杀手’一词、唤起BR2049主角‘K’联想的视觉图像或视听内容、和/或唤起BR2049标志性场景和设定的视觉图像或视听内容，均属于具有第二含义的受保护商标和商业外观。”

According to the FAC, this secondary meaning “clearly” exists “in the automotive market space,” at least in part because Plaintiff “has an established record of doing business with major automotive brands to affiliate themselves and their car products with Plaintiff and BR2049.” Plaintiff asserts that at the time of the “We Robot” event, Plaintiff “was in talks with at least one automotive brand for partnerships on Plaintiff’s BR2049-based Blade Runner 2099 television series” that is currently in production, meaning that Defendants’ conduct is likely to cause confusion among Plaintiff’s potential brand partner customers and may have already caused actual confusion with potential Blade Runner 2099 car partners.

根据FAC起诉状，该第二含义“在汽车市场领域显然存在”，部分原因在于原告“与各大汽车品牌有着合作历史，这些品牌通过与原告及BR2049建立关联来推广其汽车产品”。原告声称，在“机器人大会”活动举办时，原告“正与至少一家汽车品牌洽谈基于原告BR2049的《银翼杀手2099》电视剧的合作事宜”（该电视剧目前正在制作中），因此被告方的行为可能导致原告潜在品牌合作客户产生混淆，且可能已导致《银翼杀手2099》潜在汽车合作伙伴产生实际混淆。

II. Analysis

二、分析

A. Procedural Standard & Appropriately-Considered Materials

A. 程序标准及可适当考量的材料

B. Direct Copyright Infringement

B. 直接版权侵权

Plaintiff’s first claim for relief is for “direct copyright infringement.” To prevail on a standard copyright infringement claim, Plaintiff “must demonstrate ‘(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.’”

原告的第一项救济请求是“直接版权侵权”。要在标准版权侵权诉讼中胜诉，原告必须证明“（1）拥有合法有效的版权；（2）复制了作品中具有原创性的构成元素”。

1. The Limits of Tesla’s/Musk’s Argument

1. 特斯拉/马斯克动议的范围限制

Tesla’s and Musk’s argument – up until their Reply, which is too late – is almost-exclusively only that Plaintiff’s direct copyright infringement claim cannot succeed because Plaintiff cannot show substantial similarity between its copyrighted work and the “We Robot” presentation or the 11-second slide used therein. With a minor exception, their argument did not timely cover Plaintiff’s “literal copying” theory of direct copyright infringement based upon the allegation that Plaintiff’s copyright was infringed because – according to Plaintiff’s allegations – Musk/Tesla fed a literal copy of Plaintiff’s copyrighted work into an AIdriven image generator in order to achieve the ultimate slide displayed during the “We Robot” event. Musk’s and Tesla’s limited discussion of Plaintiff’s “literal copying” theory is to highlight that Plaintiff’s allegations in this regard are based “on information and belief,” that the theory is not plausible because Tesla has already told Plaintiff how it claims to have created the 11-second slide image used during the presentation, and because a review of BR2049 and the “Accused Work”  somehow makes it clear that Tesla/Musk did not “literally copy” BR2049 in the manner Plaintiff asserts.

特斯拉与马斯克的抗辩主张直至其提交答辩状时才提出，为时已晚——，并且几乎全篇仅在于主张：原告直接版权侵权的控诉不能成立，因为原告无法证明其受版权保护的作品与“机器人大会”发布会或其中使用的11秒幻灯片之间存在实质性相似。除一个次要例外情形外，其主张未及时涵盖原告基于以下指控的“字面复制”直接版权侵权理论：根据原告的主张，马斯克/特斯拉将原告受版权保护的作品的字面副本输入人工智能图像生成器，以制作“机器人大会”发布会中展示的最终幻灯片。马斯克与特斯拉对原告“字面复制”理论的有限讨论仅强调，原告的“字面复制”主张旨在强调其就此提出的指控系“基于所知所信”，该理论缺乏合理性，理由如下：特斯拉已向原告说明其声称如何创作演示中使用的11秒幻灯片图像，且通过对BR2049与“被控侵权作品”的审查可知，特斯拉/马斯克并未以原告所主张的方式“字面复制”BR2049。。

Musk and Tesla concede that “pleading on information and belief is permissible where the facts are peculiarly within the defendant’s possession,” among other situations. They do not explain how that does not exactly describe the situation here, where Plaintiff is certainly not in a first-handknowledge position to know exactly how Musk/Tesla created the image in question (apart from Tesla’s simple say-so).

马斯克与特斯拉承认，“在事实由被告方独家掌握等情形下，基于所知所信提出主张是允许的”。但他们未解释为何本案情形并非如此——原告显然无法直接知晓马斯克/特斯拉创作所涉图像的具体方式（除非仅依据特斯拉的单方面陈述）。

Moreover, as noted above, “a plaintiff may plead facts on information and belief ‘where the belief is based on factual information that makes the inference of culpability plausible.’” Waln v. Dysart Sch. Dist., 54 F.4th 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Soo Park, 851 F.3d at 928 (9th Cir. 2017)); see also Stevenson & Fitzgerald, Rutter Group Prac. Guide: Federal Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2024), ¶ 8:128.22, at 834 – 35 (indicating that “information and belief” allegations simply require “some factual content,” whereas “conclusory allegations based on nothing more than ‘information and belief’ will not suffice”); cf. Nayab v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 942 F.3d 480, 49394 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Even under the more rigid pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 . . . the pleader is not required to allege facts that are ‘peculiarly within the opposing party’s knowledge,’ and allegations ‘based on information and belief may suffice,’ ‘so long as the allegations are accompanied by a statement of facts upon which the belief is founded.’”) (quoting Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987)). Here, there is sufficient factual information to do just that, and therefore to permit Plaintiff’s “information and belief” allegations on the topic of how Exhibit C to the FAC was created.

此外，如上文所述，“原告可以基于所知所信提出事实主张，‘如果该信念是基于事实信息，使得推断被告责任是合理的’。Waln诉戴萨特学区案，54 F.4th 1152, 1161（第九巡回法院，2022年）（引自Soo Park案，851 F.3d at 928（第九巡回法院，2017年））；另参见Stevenson & Fitzgerald，《拉特尔集团实务指南：庭审前联邦民事诉讼程序》（拉特尔集团，2024年），第8:128.22节，第834-835页（指出基于“信息和信念”的主张仅需“一定的事实内容”，而“仅基于‘信息和信念’且无其他依据的结论性主张不足以成立”）；另参见Nayab诉Capital One银行（美国）有限公司案，942 F.3d 480, 493-94（第九巡回法院，2019年）（“即使根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第9条更严格的起诉标准……起诉方也无需主张‘属于对方专属知识’的事实，基于所知所信的主张‘可能足够’，‘只要该主张附有支持该信念的事实陈述’”）（引自Wool诉Tandem电脑公司案，818 F.2d 1433, 1439（第九巡回法院，1987年））。本案中，存在足够的事实信息支持原告基于信息和信念就FAC起诉状附件C的创作方式提出主张。

In particular, Plaintiff has alleged that Musk and Tesla attempted to get permission to use BR2049, but that attempt was denied just hours before the “We Robot” presentation was to begin (with at least the late-nature of that denial apparently due to the fact that no one attempted to approach Plaintiff about the inquiry until that very day). Plaintiff also has placed before the Court the ultimate image used and samples of still images taken from BR2049. It is not controversial to observe that there are certainly several similarities (though the Court does not address the topic of “substantial similarity” here) between the ultimate image Musk and Tesla used and the source material Plaintiff alleges they used. Given the tight timeframe Musk and Tesla were working with in light of their last-minute request – and the resulting last-minute denial – to make use of BR2049, it is not at all implausible for Plaintiff to allege on informationand-belief that they made use of an AI image-generator to come up with the finished product. In addition, the images are not so different that the Court can conclude Tesla and Musk could not possibly have literally copied in the manner so-alleged. Thus, each of Tesla’s and Musk’s timely-raised limited arguments regarding the “literal copying” theory fail.

具体而言，原告主张马斯克与特斯拉曾试图获得使用BR2049的许可，但该许可申请在“机器人大会”发布会预定开始前数小时被驳回（至少该驳回具有紧迫性，原因显然是直至当天才首次向原告提出相关申请）。原告还向法院提交了最终使用的图像及BR2049的静态图像样本。无可争议的是，马斯克与特斯拉使用的最终图像与原告主张其使用的原始材料之间存在若干相似之处（尽管法院此处不涉及“实质性相似性”问题）。考虑到马斯克与特斯拉因最后一刻提出许可申请（及随之而来的驳回）而面临的紧迫时间限制，原告基于信息和信念主张其利用人工智能图像生成器创作最终作品，并非不合理。此外，该等图像并非存在本质差异，因此法院不能认定特斯拉与马斯克绝无可能以原告主张的方式进行字面复制。因此，特斯拉与马斯克就“字面复制”理论及时提出的各项有限主张均不能成立。

Because Musk and Tesla did not enunciate a way to successfully dispose of Plaintiff’s “literal copying” theory in their motion, at a bare minimum it – and the direct copyright infringement claim in general – survives this motion against them. This Court does not typically “dismiss” theories, or parts of claims in connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. As such, Musk’s and Tesla’s “substantial similarity”-directed argument, and the numerous ways in which Plaintiff believes it survives those arguments, are not resolved at this time.

由于马斯克与特斯拉未在其动议中提出有效理由驳回原告的“字面复制”理论，至少该理论（以及整体的直接版权侵权主张）对其而言可在本动议中存续。本院通常不会在依据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第12(b)(6)条提出的动议中“驳回”特定理论或主张的部分内容。因此，马斯克与特斯拉针对“实质性相似性”提出的抗辩，以及原告认为其可应对该等主张的各项理由，均不在本案现阶段予以裁决。

2. Warner’s “Volitional Conduct” Argument

2. 华纳的“自愿行为”抗辩主张

Apart from relying on Musk’s/Tesla’s arguments for why Plaintiff’s direct copyright infringement claim should be dismissed, Warner makes the additional argument that Plaintiff has not and cannot plead any causation, or “volitional conduct,” by Warner.

除依赖马斯克/特斯拉关于原告直接版权侵权主张应被驳回的理由外，华纳还提出额外主张，即原告未能、且无法主张华纳存在任何因果关系或华纳实施了构成侵权的“自愿行为”。

Warner asserts that Plaintiff’s only theory on this point is that the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s public display rights “was conducted on, and transmitted over, Warner-owned or Warner-controlled property, infrastructure and systems (specifically including Warner’s livestreaming infrastructure systems).”Warner likens this situation to the conduct alleged in Giganews, which was insufficient to meet this requirement of a direct infringement claim.

华纳主张，原告在该问题上的唯一理论是，据称侵犯原告公开展示权的行为“是在华纳所有或控制的财产、基础设施及系统（特别是华纳的直播基础设施系统）上实施并传播的”。华纳将本案情形比作Giganews案中被认定不足以满足直接侵权主张要求的行为。

Plaintiff responds that Warner is “reading the ‘volitional conduct’ requirement too strictly” and ignoring what the FAC actually says Warner did. Plaintiff relies on Bell v. Wilmott Storage Services, LLC, 12 F.4th 1065 (9th Cir. 2021), for the first point.

原告回应称，华纳“对‘自愿行为’要求的解读过于严格”，且忽视了FAC起诉状中关于华纳实际行为的陈述。原告就第一个观点援引了Bell诉Wilmott存储服务有限责任公司案，12 F.4th 1065（第九巡回法院，2021年）。

Bell explained that the Ninth Circuit had “held that a website or service that provides only a platform for third-party users to upload, download, and share content, i.e., merely using the platform as a vehicle, has not engaged in volitional conduct in [the relevant] sense, because it is the users who cause infringement.” Id. at 1081. “By contrast, one who ‘exercised control’ or ‘selected any material for upload, download, transmission, or storage’ has acted volitionally.” Id. (quoting VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 723, 732 (9th Cir. 2019)).

在Bell案中，第九巡回法院曾裁定，“仅为第三方用户提供上传、下载和分享内容的平台（即仅将平台用作载体）的网站或服务，并未从事相关意义上的自愿行为，因为侵权行为是由用户造成的”。同案，第1081页。“相反，‘行使控制权’或‘选择任何用于上传、下载、传播或存储的材料’的主体，构成自愿行为”。同案（引自VHT公司诉Zillow集团公司案，918 F.3d 723, 732（第九巡回法院，2019年））。

Plaintiff concedes that “a strictly passive supplier or passive owner of equipment” would not have sufficient “volitional conduct.” Docket No. 54, at 12:6-9. But Plaintiff also argues that Warner “fails to acknowledge ... that if the equipment supplier or owner is more than strictly passive by, for example, ‘exercising control’ or by ‘selecting any material for upload, download, transmission, or storage,’ the volitional conduct requirement is satisfied.” Id. at 12:11-15. Plaintiff believes that its allegations at paragraphs 86-98 of the FAC satisfy that standard: that Warner “actively worked on Musk and Tesla’s behalf to try to get Plaintiff to give Musk and Tesla permission to use BR2049 for the marketing event.” Plaintiff also offers that, if needed, it could:

原告承认，“严格意义上的被动供应商或设备的被动所有人”不具备足够的“自愿行为”。案卷编号54，第12页第6-9行。但原告还主张，华纳“未能承认……如果设备供应商或所有人并非严格被动——例如，通过‘行使控制权’或‘选择任何用于上传、下载、传播或存储的材料’——则满足自愿行为要求”。同案卷第12页第11-15行。原告认为，其在FAC起诉状第86-98段中的主张满足该标准：华纳“积极代表马斯克和特斯拉，试图促使原告允许马斯克和特斯拉在营销活动中使用BR2049”。原告还表示，如有必要，其可以：

Amend to more expressly state that Warner’s shared services personnel expressly told Plaintiff’s personnel at the time (on the afternoon of October 10, 2024) that executives at the ‘highest levels’ of Warner ‘not located in Burbank’ had firmly directed the shared services personnel in Burbank to clear BR2049 for Musk and Tesla with urgency, because of the importance of the Musk-Tesla event to the larger Warner entity, and Musk (or Tesla) wanted BR2049.

“修正起诉状，更明确地说明华纳的共享服务人员当时（2024年10月10日下午）曾明确告知原告人员，‘不在伯班克的’华纳‘最高层级’高管已坚定指示伯班克的共享服务人员紧急为马斯克和特斯拉获得BR2049的使用许可，因为马斯克-特斯拉活动对华纳集团整体具有重要意义，且马斯克（或特斯拉）希望使用BR2049。”

Plaintiff believes that “it certainly seems that actively helping Musk and Tesla to use BR2049, a piece of content which Musk specifically wanted and expected to get as part of his expensive event at the Warner-owned Burbank studio lot, just hours before the infringement, adequately constitutes Warner ‘exercising control’ or ‘selecting any material for... transmission.’” However, Plaintiff cites no case law or other authority supporting that belief.

原告认为，“在侵权行为发生前仅数小时，积极协助马斯克和特斯拉使用BR2049（马斯克明确希望并期望将其作为其在华纳所有的伯班克制片厂场地举办的高价活动的一部分），显然构成华纳‘行使控制权’或‘选择任何用于……传播的材料’”。然而，原告未援引任何判例法或其他依据支持该主张。

Warner responds that Bell is actually consistent with the point Warner is trying to make here. In contrast with Bell – where the infringing photo existed on the defendant’s server hosting the website (which the defendant managed), and where the Ninth Circuit explained that the defendant “did not merely function as an online platform where third-party users independently upload and share materials,” – here Warner is only alleged to be a passive supplier of equipment and/or means.

华纳回应称，Bell案实际上与华纳试图提出的观点一致。与Bell案（被控侵权照片存储在被告管理的网站服务器上，且第九巡回法院解释称被告“并非仅作为第三方用户独立上传和分享材料的在线平台”）不同，本案中华纳仅被主张为设备和/或手段的被动供应商。

With respect to paragraphs 86-98 – cited by Plaintiff in response to Warner’s volitional-conduct argument – Warner states that these allegations are limited to “discussions between the Defendants and that [Warner] tried to obtain permission from Plaintiff for Musk and Tesla to use BR2049.” Warner points out that this (failed) clearance work has no apparent connection to any right or ability to supervise or control Musk’s or Tesla’s decisions concerning what Musk and Tesla eventually used in connection with their “We Robot” presentation. Warner also argues that Plaintiff’s proposed amendment on this topic would do nothing to move the ball on the question of Warner’s right or ability to control Musk’s/Tesla’s decision – “the fact that Warner was helping to clear BR2049 for use at the event merely shows that [Warner] sought to go through the proper channels to obtain permission to use Plaintiff’s work.”

关于原告在回应华纳的自愿行为主张时援引的第86-98段，华纳称，该等主张仅限于“被告方之间的讨论，以及华纳曾试图为马斯克和特斯拉获得原告使用BR2049的许可”。华纳指出，这项（未成功的）权利核查工作与华纳是否有权或有能力监督或控制马斯克或特斯拉就其“机器人大会”发布会最终使用的内容所做的决定，无任何明显关联。华纳还主张，原告就该问题提出的修正建议，对华纳是否有权利或有能力控制马斯克/特斯拉的决定并无任何影响——“华纳协助为活动使用BR2049进行权利核查，仅表明华纳试图通过正当渠道获得使用原告作品的许可”。

The Court must agree with Warner here, and disagree with Plaintiff’s position that Warner’s argument amounts, simply and improperly, to “factual denial.” Warner has actually directly addressed the facts as Plaintiff has alleged them. Warner’s (failed) attempts to clear permission for Musk/Tesla were in no way demonstrative of Warner “exercising control” or of Warner selecting any material that actually wound up in, or contributed to, the “We Robot” event. Nothing that Plaintiff has indicated that it could add by way of amendment would make any difference to that observation/conclusion, because that additional material still relates only to Warner’s (failed) efforts at clearance. There is nothing factual (or that the Court must credit as true) that Warner played any selection-role beyond that failure.

法院必须认同华纳的观点，而不认同原告关于华纳的主张仅构成不当“事实否认”的说法。华纳实际上直接回应了原告提出的事实主张。华纳为马斯克/特斯拉进行的（未成功的）许可申请尝试，绝不能证明华纳“行使了控制权”，或华纳选择了最终纳入“机器人大会”发布会或对其有贡献的任何材料。原告表示其可通过修正补充的任何内容，均不会改变该结论，因该等补充材料仍仅与华纳的（未成功的）权利核查努力相关。不存在任何事实（或法院必须认定为真实的事实）表明华纳除该未成功的尝试外，还发挥了任何选择作用。

At most, Plaintiff alleges that, after last-minute attempts to secure rights through Plaintiff failed, Warner essentially “stood by” and did nothing, with Plaintiff asserting that Warner “either effectively blessed Musk and Tesla to incorporate BR2049 in the event anyway, and/or failed to take meaningful action to stop them, although such action was available,” “empowering” Musk “to do it anyway.” Even ignoring that the allegation is made on information and belief (and on this particular point Plaintiff does not have sufficient facts surrounding the allegation to make it in this manner), this is not exercising control or selecting material. And there is nothing akin to the websiteowner defendant’s hosting of infringing content on its servers in Bell. Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations reveal that Warner acted, at most, as a “platform for third-party users to upload, download, and share content, i.e., merely using the platform as a vehicle.” Bell, 12 F.4th at 1081. As a result, unless it indicates it has something more to add that, for some good reason, it has not already notified the Court about by way of its Opposition brief, the Court is inclined to conclude that Plaintiff’s claim for direct copyright infringement against Warner must be dismissed without leave to amend.

The claim will survive against Tesla and Musk, however.

原告至多主张，在最后一刻试图通过原告获得权利的努力失败后，华纳基本上“袖手旁观”，未采取任何行动，并称华纳“要么实际上默许马斯克和特斯拉在活动中纳入BR2049相关元素，和/或未采取可行的有效措施阻止其行为”，从而“授权”马斯克“照样实施该行为”。即使忽略该主张是基于所知所信提出的（且就该特定问题，原告没有足够的事实依据支持该主张），这也不构成行使控制权或选择材料。此外，本案情形与Bell案中网站所有人在其服务器上托管侵权内容的情形并无相似之处。相反，原告的主张表明，华纳至多仅充当了“第三方用户上传、下载和分享内容的平台，即仅将平台用作载体”。Bell案，12 F.4th at 1081。因此，除非原告表明其有其他未能通过答辩状告知法院的补充内容，否则法院倾向于认定：原告针对华纳的直接版权侵权主张应予驳回，且不给予原告修正起诉状的机会。

然而，针对特斯拉和马斯克的该主张可存续。

C. Vicarious and Contributory Copyright Infringement

C. 替代版权侵权与帮助性版权侵权

Plaintiff’s second and third claims for relief are for vicarious and contributory copyright infringement. To begin with, Tesla’s and Musk’s motion presents no argument with respect to the contributory copyright infringement claim other than that it would necessarily fail if their motion is successful in disposing of the direct infringement claim, and Warner’s motion explicitly excludes the claim from its scope. Because Tesla and Musk have not achieved their goal on this motion with respect to the direct infringement claim, Plaintiff’s contributory infringement claim necessarily survives these motions.

原告的第二项和第三项救济请求分别是替代版权侵权和帮助性版权侵权。首先，特斯拉与马斯克的动议未就帮助性版权侵权主张提出任何独立的抗辩理由，仅称若其动议成功驳回直接侵权主张，则帮助性侵权主张必然不能成立，而华纳的动议明确将该主张排除在其争议范围之外。由于特斯拉与马斯克未能通过本动议实现驳回“直接侵权主张”的目标，原告的“帮助性侵权主张”必然得以在本动议中存续。

As to the FAC’s copyright claims, therefore, that leaves Plaintiff’s claim for vicarious copyright infringement. “Vicarious infringement occurs when one profits from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.” Luvdarts, LLC v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 710 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2013). More specifically, such liability “attaches if a defendant had both the (1) ‘right and ability to supervise the infringing activity’ and (2) ‘a direct financial interest’ in the activity.”

因此，就FAC起诉状中的版权相关主张而言，仅剩原告的替代版权侵权主张有待分析。“替代侵权是指一方从直接侵权中获利，却拒绝行使制止或限制该侵权行为的权利”。Luvdarts有限责任公司诉AT&T移动有限责任公司案，710 F.3d 1068, 1071（第九巡回法院，2013年）。更具体地说，该责任“在被告同时具备以下两项条件时成立：（1）‘有权且有能力监督侵权行为’；（2）‘从该行为中获得直接经济利益’”。

1. Tesla and Musk

1. 特斯拉与马斯克

Tesla’s and Musk’s motion as to this claim (at least beyond reliance on the contention – already addressed above – that Plaintiff’s direct infringement claim must fail, that is) is limited to arguing that Plaintiff has not pled the existence of a direct financial benefit from any alleged infringing activity. Insofar as published, precedential, authority is concerned, they rely exclusively on Erickson Productions, Inc. v. Kast, 921 F.3d 822, 829 (9th Cir. 2019).

特斯拉与马斯克就该主张提出的动议（至少除依赖上文已讨论的原告直接侵权主张必须驳回的观点外），仅限于主张原告未提出充分事实，证明其从任何据称的侵权行为中获得直接经济利益。就已公布的有先例约束力的依据而言，其仅援引了Erickson制作公司案，921 F.3d 822, 829（第九巡回法院，2019年）。

In Erickson Productions, the Ninth Circuit vacated a jury’s liability verdict that had been in favor of the plaintiffs on a vicarious infringement claim. The defendant owned a real estate wealth management company, and had hired a website developer to redevelop his company’s website. Three infringing photos made their way onto the company’s developmental website. The plaintiff’s theory was that, by including unlicensed photos on the website, the defendant was both able to continue a business opportunity he desired and to avoid a required developmental licensing fee. On appeal, the plaintiff identified what it saw as three “direct financial benefits”: “(1) the photographs drew customers to purchase [the defendant’s] services; (2) [the defendant] avoided paying licensing fees to [the plaintiff]; and (3) “[the defendant] was able to ‘rush’ the launch of his website.” The Ninth Circuit agreed with the defendant that the plaintiff had not presented any evidence “that could constitute a direct financial benefit as a matter of law.”

在Erickson制作公司案中，第九巡回法院撤销了陪审团作出的支持原告替代侵权主张的责任裁决。被告拥有一家房地产财富管理公司，并雇佣了一名网站开发者重新开发其公司网站。三张侵权照片被上传至该公司的开发版网站。原告的主张是，通过在网站上使用未经许可的照片，被告既能够继续其期望的商业机会，又能够避免支付必要的开发版许可费。上诉中，原告提出了其认为的三项“直接经济利益”：“（1）照片吸引客户购买被告的服务；（2）被告避免向原告支付许可费；（3）被告能够‘加急’推出其网站。”第九巡回法院认同被告的观点，即原告未提供任何“可依法构成直接经济利益的证据”。

The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by announcing that “‘the essential aspect of the direct financial benefit inquiry is whether there is a causal relationship between the infringing activity and any financial benefit a defendant reaps.’” Id. (quoting Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004)). At least in the context of a website, however, infringing material must “‘act as a draw for customers,’” as opposed to being “‘just an added benefit.’” Id. (quoting Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1078-79). The plaintiff in the case did not contend that anyone visited the website in question “in order to view his photographs or purchased his services because they saw the photographs.” Id. at 830. Beyond that note, perhaps more-importantly, the Ninth Circuit explained that “if [the defendant] had a direct financial interest in every piece of content on this website that arguably made the website marginally more attractive or presentable, then the requirement of a causal link would be erased.” Id. Thus, it concluded that the plaintiff had not argued that the photographs “were anything more, at best, than an ‘added benefit’ to visitors of the defendant’s website.”

第九巡回法院在其分析开篇即指出，“‘直接经济利益认定的核心在于，被告获得的任何经济利益与侵权行为之间是否存在因果关系’”。同案（引自Ellison诉Robertson案，357 F.3d 1072, 1079（第九巡回法院，2004年））。然而，至少在网站语境下，侵权材料必须“‘对客户具有吸引力’”，而非仅为“‘附加利益’”。同案（引自Ellison案，357 F.3d at 1078-79）。该案原告并未主张任何人“为查看其照片而访问该网站，或因看到照片而购买其服务”。同案第830页。此外，更重要的是，第九巡回法院解释称，“如果被告对网站上任何可能使网站略微更具吸引力或更美观的内容均享有直接经济利益，那么因果关系要求将形同虚设”。同案。因此，法院认定原告未能证明该等照片“充其量不过是网站访问者的‘附加利益’”。

The Ninth Circuit next examined the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant’s avoidance of licensing fees could constitute a direct financial benefit. It rejected that argument too. See id. It took pains to first explain that, in the context of a claim for vicarious infringement, the avoided-license-fee theory must be that the alleged vicarious infringer received a direct financial benefit from the alleged direct infringer’s avoidance of a licensing fee, but that the direct infringer’s saving of money cannot satisfy the requirement of a direct financial benefit to the vicarious infringer. “Otherwise, the requirement of a direct financial benefit would be rendered meaningless, since – at least where, as here, licenses are for sale – a direct infringer necessarily saves money by failing to obtain a license.” Id. Yet, even if the direct-infringer website developer had “turned its lower costs from fee avoidance into lower prices for its website design services,” this savings benefit to the alleged vicarious infringer “would not be ‘direct,’ since it would reach that defendant only incidentally, via the website developer’s intervening decision to cut prices.”

第九巡回法院随后审查了原告关于被告避免支付许可费可构成直接经济利益的主张，并同样予以驳回。参见同案。法院首先明确指出，在替代侵权主张的语境下，避免许可费的理论必须是指被控替代侵权人从直接侵权人的许可费规避行为中获得直接经济利益，但直接侵权人节省的费用不能满足替代侵权人获得直接经济利益的要求。参见同案。“否则，直接经济利益要求将失去意义，因为——至少在存在许可可供购买的情况下——直接侵权人未获得许可必然会节省费用”。然而，即使直接侵权人（网站开发者）“将其因避免支付费用而降低的成本转化为更低的网站设计服务价格”，该等节省给被控替代侵权人带来的利益“也并非‘直接’利益，因该利益需通过网站开发者降低价格的中间决策才能惠及该被告”。

Unfortunately,Plaintiff’s single-paragraph response in connection with its vicarious infringement claim completely ignores Erickson Productions. Instead, in an echo of its answer to Warner’s volitional-conduct argument addressed supra, it simply argues that Tesla and Musk have read the rules regarding such a claim “too narrowly” and, citing an unpublished district court decision, that “all that is needed is a showing that ‘there is a causal relationship between the infringing activity and any financial benefit a defendant reaps.’” Insofar as this ignores the requirement that such financial benefit be “direct,” this is a clear misstatement – or at least understatement – of Ninth Circuit law

on the topic.

遗憾的是，原告就其替代侵权主张作出的单段回应完全忽略了Erickson制作公司案。相反，其仅重复了针对华纳的自愿行为主张的回应逻辑（见上文），称特斯拉与马斯克对该类主张的规则“解读过于狭隘”，并援引一份未公布的地区法院判决称，“所需的全部要素是证明‘被告获得的任何经济利益与侵权行为之间存在因果关系’”。该主张忽略了该经济利益必须是“直接”利益的要求，显然是对第九巡回法院关于该问题的法律规定的错误陈述——或至少是不完整陈述。

Plaintiff also believes – without citation to supporting authority – that “intentionally using the infringing activity as the lead of an advertisement to semiotically move the audience to be more receptive to buying company stock and the company’s products is a direct enough causal relationship.” It is unclear how it can make that argument in a way that is consistent with Erickson Productions. Plaintiff’s allegations that the alleged infringing material itself acted as a “draw” are simply too conclusory.

原告还认为（未援引任何支持依据），“故意将侵权行为作为广告的开篇，通过符号学手段促使观众更愿意购买公司股票及公司产品，该因果关系已足够直接”。目前尚不清楚该主张如何能与Erickson制作公司案的规定保持一致。原告关于据称的侵权材料本身具有“吸引力”的主张，纯属结论性陈述。

In sum, it appears that Plaintiff has no response to Erickson Productions, that the allegedly-offending material in the “We Robot” event is indistinguishable from the mere “added benefit” described in that case, and that Plaintiff’s vicarious infringement theory comes up short with respect to Tesla and Musk. Plaintiff has not explained how it could possibly amend around these observations, meaning that a dismissal of the claim as to Tesla and Musk is likely to be without leave to amend.

综上，原告似乎无法回应Erickson制作公司案的规定，“机器人大会”活动中据称的侵权材料与该案中描述的单纯“附加利益”并无区别，且原告的替代侵权理论未能满足针对特斯拉和马斯克的相关要求。原告未解释其如何能够通过修正来弥补该等缺陷，因此针对特斯拉和马斯克的该主张的驳回，很可能将不予准许其再次修正。

2. Warner

2. 华纳

Unlike Tesla and Musk, Warner challenges Plaintiff’s ability to successfully plead either of the required vicarious infringement elements.

与特斯拉和马斯克不同，华纳对原告能否成功主张替代侵权的两项必要要素均提出了质疑。

a. Right/Ability to Supervise/Control

a. 监督/控制的权利/能力

“A defendant ‘exercises control over a direct infringer when he has both a legal right to stop or limit the directly infringing conduct, as well as the practical ability to do so.’” Range Road, 668 F.3d at 1155 (quoting Amazon.com, 487 F.3d at 730).

“当被告既享有制止或限制直接侵权行为的法定权利，又具有实际制止或限制该行为的能力时，即构成对直接侵权人的控制”。（援引Range Road案，668 F.3d at 1155；亚马逊公司案，487 F.3d at 730）。

With respect to the right/ability to supervise/control, Warner argues that Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory (and on information and belief), and/or are based on Warner’s pre-event clearance efforts and mere awareness of the situation. Warner also relies on what it insists is the actual and only contract between itself and Tesla in order to contradict Plaintiff’s allegations on this point but, as explained above, the Court will not consider that document in connection with these motions. Warner does correctly argue that the Court is not required to accept as true Plaintiff’s allegations that any direct infringers were Warner’s agents, employees, or contractors. Those allegations are entirely conclusory. Warner also argues that Plaintiff’s control/supervision allegations fall short of those present in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996), a case that Warner also asserts was weakened by the later-decided Amazon.com.

关于监督/控制的权利/能力，华纳主张原告的主张仅为结论性陈述（并且是基于所知所信），和/或基于华纳活动前的核查所作努力及单纯的知情。华纳还依赖其坚称的与特斯拉之间的唯一实际合同，试图反驳原告的相关主张，但如上文所述，法院在审理本动议时不会考虑该文件。华纳还正确主张，法院无需采纳原告关于任何直接侵权人均为华纳的代理人、员工或承包商的主张——该等主张纯属结论性陈述。华纳还主张，原告关于控制/监督的主张未能达到Fonovisa公司诉Cherry Auction公司案，76 F.3d 259（第九巡回法院，1996年）中确立的标准——华纳还称，该案的效力已被后续作出的亚马逊公司案削弱。

The Court begins here with the observation that this is not a quintessential situation involving, for example, ownership of a music venue where infringing musical compositions are regularly performed (financially benefitting that venue and its owner). See Range Road, 668 F.3d at 1151-53, 1155; Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262 (referencing “dance hall cases”). Nor is this even a more-generally-described situation where continued, unquestionable, known infringement has occurred, and is continuing to occur, in a particular forum, and a defendant has the ability to block infringing users from accessing that forum. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa International Service Association, 494 F.3d 788, 803-04 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Visa International”); A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1023. As far as the FAC has identified, this was a one-time event, and Warner had no notice of any alleged infringing activity until the “We Robot” presentation was already up on the screen/livescreen. Were Musk and/or Tesla an alleged repeat offender/infringer using Warner’s resources and instrumentalities for publication, there might be a different answer in this situation.

法院首先指出，本案并非典型情形——例如，拥有经常播放侵权音乐作品的音乐场所（该场所及其所有人从中获得经济利益）。参见Range Road案，668 F.3d at 1151-53, 1155；Fonovisa案，76 F.3d at 262（提及“舞厅案件”）。本案甚至也不属于更一般意义上的已知侵权行为在特定场所持续发生，而被告有能力阻止侵权用户访问该场所的情形。参见Perfect 10公司诉维萨国际服务协会案，494 F.3d 788, 803-04（第九巡回法院，2007年）（“维萨国际案”）；A&M唱片公司案，239 F.3d at 1023。据FAC起诉状所述，本案涉及的是一次性活动，且华纳在“机器人大会”发布会的相关内容已出现在屏幕/直播画面后才得知任何据称的侵权行为。若马斯克和/或特斯拉是多次利用华纳资源和工具进行发布的被控重复侵权人，则本案的裁判结论可能有所不同。

Instead, Plaintiff has alleged here that Warner took certain steps in advance of the “We Robot” event in an attempt to obtain proper clearance of BR2049, but that those efforts failed. Beyond that, Plaintiff simply asserts – without citation to any facts supporting the assertion, making it an improper/insufficient information-and-belief allegation – that Warner “blessed Musk and Tesla to incorporate BR2049 in the event anyway, and/or failed to take meaningful action to stop them, although such action was available,” leaving Musk to feel “empowered” to use BR2049 anyway.  Plaintiff has made no effort to explain what “such action was available” means factually. See also id. ¶ 18 (alleging that Warner “ultimately failed” “to keep Musk bounded by well-established rules of the business” “when it could have”); id. ¶ 142 (alleging on information and belief that “the issue of whether or not Musk and Tesla should be allowed to use any aspect of the BR2049 property in the event and whether Warner should do anything to stop them from doing so was raised internally at Warner to a very high level Warner executive, such that Warner was actively aware of the issue, and did nothing to stop it”). The other allegations on this topic are entirely conclusory, meaning that the Court need not accept them as true. See id. ¶ 34 (alleging that the “We Robot” event “was actively monitored by, supervised by, and ultimately controlled by and directed by executives at” Warner). Even if the Court were to accept as true Plaintiff’s summary assertion that, because of its pre-clearance role/efforts, Warner must have had the right and ability to tell Tesla/Musk that their infringing conduct was not acceptable and could not be part of the presentation, Ninth Circuit authority indicates that being in that position is insufficient for purposes of this element.

相反，原告在本案中主张¹⁹，华纳在“机器人大会”活动前采取了某些措施，试图为BR2049获得适当的权利许可，但该等努力未成功。除此之外，原告仅主张（未援引任何支持该主张的事实，构成不适当/不充分的基于信息和信念的主张），华纳“默许马斯克和特斯拉在活动中纳入BR2049相关元素，和/或未采取可行的有效措施阻止其行为”，导致马斯克认为其“有权”照样使用BR2049。原告未解释“可行的有效措施”在事实上是指什么。另参见同起诉状第18段（主张华纳“最终未能”“约束马斯克遵守业内既定规则”，“本可阻止却未阻止”）；同起诉状第142段（基于所知所信主张，“马斯克和特斯拉是否应被允许在活动中使用BR2049的任何元素，以及华纳是否应采取任何措施阻止其使用该等元素的问题，已在华纳内部上报至高层管理人员，因此华纳知晓该问题，但未采取任何阻止措施”）。关于该问题的其他主张均为结论性陈述，因此法院无需采纳其真实性。参见同起诉状第34段（主张“器人大会”活动“由华纳高管积极监控、监督并最终控制和指导”）。即使法院采纳原告的概括性主张——即由于华纳在活动前的权利核查角色/努力，其必然有权且有能力告知特斯拉/马斯克其侵权行为不可接受，不得纳入发布会内容——第九巡回法院的相关依据也表明，仅处于该等地位不足以满足该要素的要求。

In Visa International, the defendant payment network had certain rules and regulations that merchants and member banks had to agree to follow. Those rules “prohibited member banks from providing services to merchants engaging in certain illegal activities and required members and member banks to investigate merchants suspected of engaging in such illegal activity and to terminate their participation in the payment network if certain illegal activity is found.” Though the plaintiff had notified the defendants that underlying copyright infringement was occurring and the defendants “could have stopped processing credit card payments to the infringing websites,” these allegations still were not sufficient to support a finding of the defendant’s “right and ability to control the infringing activity.”

在维萨国际案中，被告支付网络制定了商家及会员银行必须遵守的规则和条例。该等规则 “禁止会员银行向从事特定非法活动的商家提供服务，并要求会员及会员银行调查涉嫌从事该等非法活动的商家，若确认存在非法活动则终止其在支付网络中的参与资格”。尽管原告已告知被告存在潜在版权侵权行为，且被告“本可停止向侵权网站处理信用卡支付”，但该等指控仍不足以认定被告具有 “监督侵权行为的权利和能力”。

The Ninth Circuit explained that the right “to affect ... infringing acts to some degree” or the right to terminate an advertisement or sponsorship relationship still would not equate to a right to stop direct infringement, because the direct infringers can still “‘continue to reproduce, display, and distribute its infringing copies’” even after such a termination occurs. (quoting Amazon.com, 487 F.3d at 730). This was consistent with the Circuit’s Amazon.com decision. See 508 F.3d at 1173-74. “The mere ability to withdraw a financial ‘carrot’ does not create the ‘stick’ of ‘right and ability to control’ that vicarious infringement requires.”; see also id. at 804 (“The defendants cannot take away the tools the offending websites use to reproduce, alter, and distribute the infringing images over the Internet. They can only take away the means the websites currently use to sell them.”); id. (“The ability to exert financial pressure does not give Defendants the right or ability to control the actual infringing activity at issue in this case. Defendants have no absolute right to stop that activity – they cannot stop websites from reproducing, altering, or distributing infringing images.”).

第九巡回上诉法院解释，“在一定程度上影响侵权行为” 的权利，或终止广告或赞助关系的权利，并不等同于制止直接侵权的权利，因即使终止该等关系，直接侵权人仍可“‘继续复制、展示和分发其侵权复制品’”（援引亚马逊公司案，《联邦判例汇编》第三辑第487卷第730页）。这与该巡回法院在亚马逊公司案中的裁决一致（见《联邦判例汇编》第三辑第 508 卷第1173-1174页）：“‘仅有权撤回经济 “诱饵”，并不构成替代侵权所需的 “监督控制权”这一“强制手段”’”；另见同第 804 页：“‘被告无法剥夺侵权网站用于在互联网上复制、修改和分发侵权影像的工具，仅能剥夺该等网站目前用于销售侵权影像的渠道’”；同页：“‘施加经济压力的能力，并不能赋予被告监督本案所涉实际侵权行为的权利或能力。被告并无绝对权利制止该等行为——无法阻止网站复制、修改或分发侵权影像’”。

The same is true here; there is nothing indicating that Warner had such a supervisory/controlling position or role vis a vis Tesla and Musk that it could have prevented Tesla and Musk from doing what it is that Plaintiff alleges those defendants did in creating the particular slide exhibited during the “We Robot” event. A generic allegation that Warner “actively supervised and managed the business and contractual relationship with Musk and Tesla”, is not the same as alleging – let alone factually – that Warner actively supervised and managed the selection of material to include in the “We Robot” presentation. And there are no facts alleged that Warner had any foreknowledge concerning the particular image that Tesla and Musk were planning, and did, display. “Ratification” and knowing-acceptance of benefits, are not the standard (at least not without a factual allegation that Warner’s “ratification” was a required part of the process leading to the event). Plaintiff has fallen short both with respect to Warner’s “legal right” to stop Musk/Tesla and its “practical ability” to do so.

本案亦同理：无任何证据表明华纳对特斯拉与马斯克具有足够的监督/控制地位或作用，足以阻止其实施原告所指控的、制作 “机器人世界”活动系争幻灯片的行为。原告关于华纳 “积极监督和管理与马斯克及特斯拉的商业和合同关系” 的概括性指控，不同于（更无事实支持）华纳积极监督和管理“机器人世界” 活动所涉展示材料选择的主张。且无任何事实指控表明华纳事先知晓特斯拉与马斯克计划并最终展示的特定影像。“追认”及明知而接受利益并非该要件的认定标准（至少在无事实指控表明，华纳的 “追认”是活动开展的必要环节的情况下）。原告既未证明华纳具有制止马斯克/特斯拉的“法律权利”，也未证明其具有“实际能力”。

Moreover, Warner is correct that Fonovisa is at the very least distinguishable, and Plaintiff extends no effort to argue otherwise. There, the swap meet-operator “retain[ed] the right to exclude any vendor for any reason, at any time, and thus could exclude vendors for patent and trademark infringement.” Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261; see also id. at 262 (“According to the complaint, Cherry Auction had the right to terminate vendors for any reason whatsoever and through that right had the ability to control the activities of vendors on the premises.”). There is no equivalent allegation here.

此外，华纳关于“丰诺维萨公司案至少具有可区分性”的主张正确，而原告未就此提出任何反驳。丰诺维萨公司案中，跳蚤市场经营者 “有权以任何理由、在任何时候拒绝任何商贩入场，因此可拒绝涉及专利和商标侵权的商贩”（丰诺维萨公司案，《联邦判例汇编》第二辑第76卷第261页）；另见同第262页：“根据起诉状，彻丽拍卖公司有权以任何理由终止与商贩的关系，并通过该权利监督场内商贩的活动”。本案无类似指控。

Finally, if the line in Plaintiff’s Opposition to Warner’s motion that summarily asserts that Warner “was actively involved in trying to clear BR2049 and wrangling Musk and Tesla,” or the statement that Warner “was paying close attention to Musk, and did not want to upset him,” are attempts to satisfy the control/supervision requirement – the Court cannot conceive how they would be attempts to satisfy the direct financial benefit requirement – they fall short because Plaintiff has not remotely supported the proposition that a third party’s attempt to clear rights or an avoidance of “upset” demonstrates a right to supervise or control an alleged first-party infringer’s later act of infringement once that clearance attempt has failed (especially without any forewarning of such an upcoming infringement).

最后，若原告在对华纳动议的答辩中称华纳 “积极参与《银翼杀手2049》的权利核查并约束马斯克与特斯拉”，或“密切关注马斯克，不愿使其不满”，是为满足监督 / 控制要件（本院无法理解该等表述如何能满足直接经济利益要件），则该等主张不能成立 —— 原告未提供任何依据证明，第三方的权利核查尝试或避免 “他人不满”，可构成对直接侵权人事后侵权行为的监督或控制权（尤其在未事先告知该等侵权即将发生的情况下）。

Plaintiff appears to fall short with respect to this required element of its vicarious infringement claim against Warner, and it has not offered even a suggestion as to how it might amend in a relevant respect. This deficiency by itself is sufficient for the Court to dismiss this claim against Warner, and such dismissal likely would be without leave to amend.

原告未能满足其对华纳替代侵权诉求的该项必要要件，且未提出任何可通过补充修正弥补该缺失的方式。仅该缺陷本身即足以使本院驳回原告对华纳的该项诉求，且该驳回判决很可能不允许其补充修正。

Nevertheless, the Court will continue on to discuss the other required element of the claim as to Warner as well.

尽管如此，本院仍将继续讨论原告对华纳该项诉求的另一必要要件。

b. Direct Financial Interest/Benefit

b. 直接经济利益

Like Tesla and Musk, Warner also challenges Plaintiff’s attempt to make out a “direct financial benefit” allegation. Also like those defendants, Warner relies – insofar as published, precedential, Ninth Circuit decisions are concerned – only on Erickson Productions.

与特斯拉和马斯克一样，华纳也对原告试图主张“直接经济利益”的陈述提出质疑。同样，与该两名被告相同，就已公布的有约束力的第九巡回法院判决而言，华纳仅援引了Erickson制作公司案。

Warner specifically addresses Plaintiff’s allegations that Musk and Tesla believed that they were going to get to use a Hollywood motion picture at no extra charge, and that this was a “draw” to Musk and Tesla for the money they paid Warner for the event. Warner provides reasons why this allegation does not identify a direct benefit, but a reason not given is more persuasive – and conclusive – to the Court on this point. The alleged infringement had not even occurred at the time Warner and Tesla were negotiating arrangements for the “We Robot” event, so how could this financial benefit possibly be a “direct” financial benefit tied to the infringement? Any such “draw” in this respect would be connected to a “direct” benefit from a promise or suggestion from Warner, warranted or not, not from the later infringement actually allegedly committed during the “We Robot” presentation. There must be a direct financial benefit from the alleged infringement. There is no direct financial benefit connection with any alleged infringement under this contractual-negotiation/terms “draw” theory.

华纳具体回应了原告的主张，即马斯克与特斯拉认为，其无需额外支付费用即可使用某部好莱坞电影作品，这是吸引马斯克与特斯拉向华纳支付活动相关费用的“诱因”。华纳提出了多项理由，说明该主张无法构成直接利益，但法院认为，一项未被提及的理由更具说服力且具有决定性——在华纳与特斯拉就“机器人大会”活动洽谈相关安排时，所谓的侵权行为尚未发生，因此该经济利益如何能与侵权行为构成“直接”关联？该情形下的任何“诱因”均与华纳的承诺或暗示（无论是否合理）相关，而非与“机器人大会”发布会期间实际发生的所谓侵权行为相关。直接经济利益必须源于所谓的侵权行为。根据该“合同谈判/条款诱因”理论，无法认定其与任何所谓侵权行为存在直接经济利益关联。

Warner also addresses the theory that it allegedly had a financial incentive to avoid any claims of breach of contract from Tesla or an adjustment of the Warner-Tesla contract price, giving it reason to allow or suggest or encourage Tesla to use the allegedly-infringing work. But, again, this is not a “direct” financial benefit from the infringement; it is from Warner’s alleged non-action. Moreover, at least where a contract is involved, this theory would effectively collapse the two required elements into one – any failure to exercise any contractual right to control/supervise would automatically amount to a direct financial benefit. Plaintiff has not directed the Court to any case law – precedential or otherwise – that recognizes or allows such a theory. Warner makes exactly this point in its Reply.

华纳还回应了原告的另一项理论，即华纳据称有经济动机避免面临特斯拉的违约索赔或合同价款调整，因此有理由“允许”“建议”或“鼓励”特斯拉使用所谓的侵权作品。但同样，这并非源于侵权行为的“直接”经济利益，而是源于华纳的所谓“不作为”。此外，至少在涉及合同的情形下，该理论实际上将两项必要要素混为一谈——任何未行使合同约定的监督/控制权的行为都将自动构成直接经济利益。原告未指引法院参考任何判例法（无论是否具有先例效力）认可或支持该理论。华纳在其答辩状中也明确指出了这一点。

Plaintiff’s response to Warner in connection with its vicarious infringement claim is to assert that Warner is simply disregarding the allegations found in paragraphs 85-98 and 139-148 of the FAC and to point to other information that, on its face, has no apparent connection to either recognized required element for such a claim. In that latter regard, Plaintiff asserts that: at places in the We Robot Recording like 00:47:21-00:47:31, there appears to be an event map visible where an entire section of the event space was turned into “West World,” an important motion picture and television franchise centered around robots and artificial intelligence...

原告在针对华纳的替代侵权主张的回应中，称华纳完全无视FAC起诉状第85-98段和第139-148段的主张，并提及了其他表面上与该主张的两项法定必要要素均无明显关联的信息。关于后者，原告主张：“在‘机器人大会’发布会的部分时段（如00:47:21-00:47:31），可见一张活动地图，其中活动场地的一整个区域被布置为‘西部世界’——这是一个以机器人和人工智能为核心的重要影视IP……”

It looks like a brand affiliation where Musk and Tesla seem to be bringing what looks like hundreds of people onto the Warner studio lot and pushing Tesla car and robot products at them for hours while the attendees also get to enjoy being at the Warner lot and interacting with prominent entertainment brands in the Warner conglomerate library.

马斯克与特斯拉似乎带领数百人进入华纳制片厂场地，在数小时内推广其汽车和机器人产品，而参与者同时还能体验华纳制片厂场地的氛围，并与华纳集团影视库中的知名娱乐品牌进行互动。

Plaintiff offers no explanation for how this demonstrates, or even suggests, a right to supervise or control the alleged act(s) of infringement, or how it would show a direct financial benefit from that infringement. Nothing in this passage has anything at all to do with the actual alleged act(s) of infringement, but instead with the “We Robot” event in general.

原告未解释，该等事实如何证明或暗示华纳有权监督或控制所谓的侵权行为，或如何证明华纳从该侵权行为中获得直接经济利益。该段落内容与实际所谓的侵权行为无任何关联，仅涉及“机器人大会”活动本身。

Moreover, as with its response to Tesla’s and Musk’s motion in relation to this claim, Plaintiff again entirely avoids mention of Erickson Productions. Instead, it simply claims that “the FAC’s alleged facts constitute vicarious copyright infringement under all of the cases that the Warner Motion cites,” without actually explaining how that could possibly be true.

此外，与针对特斯拉与马斯克的动议的回应相同，原告再次完全未提及Erickson制作公司案。相反，其仅称“FAC起诉状所主张的事实，符合华纳动议中援引的所有判例所规定的替代版权侵权构成要件”，但未实际解释该主张为何能够成立。

Plaintiff does say in his Opposition that Warner “took a large amount of money from Tesla for an event where Musk expected that as part of the price Tesla was paying, he was going to get at least one specific motion picture property included in his livestreamed car ad, and the one he wanted most of all (but could not have) was BR2049.” But if that is the financial benefit supporting Plaintiff’s claim against Warner, it is not a “direct” financial benefit from the alleged infringement. It is a direct financial benefit from the alleged fact that Tesla and Warner entered into a contract/agreement. See FAC ¶ 85 (“The contract necessarily would have required substantial financial compensation to be paid by Tesla to Warner...”). If somehow Warner failed to live up to its obligations to Tesla or Musk, that might give them a reason to sue Warner for breach of contract. But an alleged act of copyright infringement by Tesla or Musk in response to any such alleged failure by Warner is not what provided Warner the financial benefit it obtained from the relationship, or the event.

原告在其答辩状中称，华纳“从特斯拉处收取了巨额费用，用于举办一场马斯克期望的活动——作为特斯拉支付价款的一部分，马斯克希望至少有一部特定的电影作品被纳入其直播汽车广告中，而他最想要（但未能获得）的正是BR2049”。但如果这是原告针对华纳的主张所依据的经济利益，则该利益并非源于所谓侵权行为的“直接”经济利益，而是源于华纳与特斯拉签订合同/协议这一所谓事实。参见FAC起诉状第85段（“该合同必然要求特斯拉向华纳（或华纳子公司）支付巨额经济补偿”）。如果华纳未能履行其对特斯拉或马斯克的义务，则特斯拉或马斯克可能有权起诉华纳违约。但特斯拉或马斯克针对华纳的所谓违约行为而实施的版权侵权行为，并非华纳从双方关系或活动中获得经济利益的原因。

As with the other required element, Plaintiff has not identified or even suggested any way in which it might amend to supply what is missing here. As such, the Court will dismiss this claim against Warner, and will likely do so without leave to amend.

与另一项必要要素相同，原告未指明或提出其可通过修正来弥补此处的缺陷。因此，法院将驳回针对华纳的该项主张，且很可能不予准许修正。

D. Lanham Act

D. 基于《兰哈姆法案》的主张

E. Conclusion 

E. 结论

The Court will deny Tesla’s and Musk’s motion with respect to Plaintiff’s first cause of action, but will grant Warner’s motion with respect to that claim. The Court will grant both motions with respect to Plaintiff’s second cause of action. The Court will deny Tesla’s and Musk’s motion with respect to Plaintiff’s third cause of action (Warner’s motion did not address that claim). The Court will grant both motions with respect to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action. To the extent the Court will grant one or both motions, it is unlikely that the Court will do so with leave to amend and, with respect to the Lanham Act claim, the claim will almost certainly be dismissed with prejudice. None of the ways in which Plaintiff has suggested it might add to the FAC would appear to make any difference at all to the flaws identified herein, meaning such amendment(s) would be futile.

法院将驳回特斯拉与马斯克针对原告第一项救济请求的动议，但将支持华纳针对该项主张的动议。法院将支持双方针对原告第二项救济请求的动议。法院将驳回特斯拉与马斯克针对原告第三项救济请求的动议（华纳的动议未涉及该项主张）。法院将支持双方针对原告第四项救济请求的动议。对于法院支持一项或两项动议的情形，法院很可能不准许修正，且针对《兰哈姆法案》主张的驳回几乎必然将具有预见性（不可再诉）。原告提出的各项可能的修正建议，均无法弥补本文所指出的缺陷，因此该等修正将是徒劳的。

The Court will not, however, make any of the Copyright Act dismissals with prejudice – should Plaintiff later uncover information that supports the viability of such claims, it may seek leave to amend at that point to attempt to “revive” them.

然而，法院不会对任何《版权法》相关主张的驳回作出具有终局性的认定——若原告日后发现支持该等主张可行性的证据，可届时申请修正，试图“恢复”该等主张。