译者 | 潘怡文 华东政法大学

一审 | 汪晨涵 复旦大学

二审 | 陈博敏 清华大学

编辑 | 王明明 南京大学  

        田  悦 华侨大学 

责编 | 马语谦 武汉理工大学

I. DJI IS ENTITLED TO SEEK RECONSIDERATION OF THIS DECISION, AND RECONSIDERATION BY THE FULL COMMISSION IS APPROPRIATE

I. 深圳市大疆创新科技有限公司（以下简称“大疆”）有权就该决定申请重新审议，且应由联邦通信委员会全体成员进行重新审议

Under Section 1.104 of the Commission’s Rules, “any person desiring Commission consideration of a final action taken pursuant to delegated authority” may seek reconsideration.

DJI satisfies both parts of this test. As a result of the listing, DJI cannot obtain authorizations to sell new communications or video surveillance equipment in one of DJI’s largest markets. Indeed, the Commission has prevented DJI from obtaining authorizations for any new products, presumably because the Commission impermissibly interprets communications and video surveillance equipment to encompass virtually every piece of equipment that can connect to a network. The Commission has also set aside many of DJI’s existing authorizations based on the listing. Finally, DJI had no opportunity to participate earlier: the listing was published without a comment period or even a prior announcement of the assessment relied on in the listing.

The Bureau should also exercise its authority under Section 1.104(b) to refer this petition to the full Commission, rather than considering it under delegated authority. This petition raises many such issues, including constitutional questions, which require action by the full Commission.

公共安全与国土安全局还应依据第1.104(b)条之规定行使职权，将本申请提交联邦通信委员会全体成员审议，而非依据授权自行处理。本申请涉及诸多此类事项，其中包含宪法相关问题，均需全体委员会作出处置。

II. THE BUREAU ERRED IN ADDING DJI’S PRODUCTS TO THE COVERED LIST AND SETTING ASIDE EXISTING AUTHORIZATIONS BASED ON THE INTERAGENCY ASSESSMENT

The Bureau added DJI’s communications and video surveillance equipment to the Covered List and set aside many of DJI’s existing equipment authorizations based exclusively on an assessment from an unidentified interagency body that contained no particularized analysis of the risk posed by DJI or its products. The Bureau’s reliance on that assessment suffers from two fundamental flaws. First, it exceeds the Commission’s statutory authority.Congress also made clear that, for DJI’s products, this determination must come from an appropriate national security agency. Second, the Bureau’s reliance on the purported national security assessment violated DJI’s due process rights because the listing has significant ramifications for DJI’s business, and DJI was afforded no process prior to the listing. Accordingly, the Commission should rescind the listing and reverse the set-asides of DJI’s existing authorizations.

A. The Interagency Assessment Was Not a “Specific Determination” by an “Appropriate National Security Agency”

Congress has set forth several requirements that must be satisfied before the Commission can add a product to the Covered List. For most products, the Commission is authorized to add a product to the list “if and only if” the Commission receives a “specific determination” that the product poses an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States from one of four enumerated sources. Those sources are: (1) an “executive branch interagency body with appropriate national security expertise”; (2) “the Department of Commerce” in specific circumstances; (3) the FY2019 NDAA; or (4) “an appropriate national security agency.” For DJI’s products, the FY2025 NDAA specifies that the determination must come from the last of these sources: “an appropriate national security agency.” The interagency assessment relied on by the Bureau to list DJI’s products is not a “specific determination” of national security risk and was not prepared by “an appropriate national security agency.” The Bureau thus lacked the authority to update the list and set aside existing authorizations based on that assessment.

国会明确规定了联邦通信委员会将产品列入管制清单的多项要件。对于大多数产品，委员会“有且仅有”在收到以下四个法定来源之一作出的关于该产品对美国国家安全构成不可接受风险的“明确认定”时，方可将其列入清单。这四类来源包括：（1）具有相应国家安全专业知识的行政部门跨部门机构；（2）特定情形下的商务部；（3）《2019财年国防授权法》；（4）相应的国家安全机构。针对大疆产品，《2025财年国防授权法》明确规定，相关认定必须来自上述第四类来源，即“相应的国家安全机构”。而公共安全与国土安全局将大疆产品列入清单所依据的跨部门评估报告，既非对国家安全风险的“具体认定”，也非由“相应的国家安全机构”编制。因此，该局无权依据该评估报告更新清单并废止现有授权。

1. The Assessment Was Not a “Specific Determination”

The assessment is not the statutorily required “specific determination” of national security risk because it does not analyze the risks associated with a particular product from a particular entity. (Nowhere does the assessment mention DJI drone or non-drone products, let alone conclude that those products specifically pose an unacceptable risk to national security.

2. The Assessment Was Not Prepared by an “Appropriate National Security Agency”

The assessment also was not prepared by “an appropriate national security agency.” The FY2025 NDAA specifically requires that “an appropriate national security agency” “shall determine” whether DJI’s communications or video surveillance equipment pose a risk to national security. 

None of those five agencies prepared the interagency assessment relied on by the Bureau to list DJI’s products. Instead, the assessment was “made by an Executive Branch interagency body with appropriate national security expertise.” An “Executive Branch interagency body” however, is different from an appropriate national security agency for purposes of the Covered List. And the Bureau explicitly recognized that “section 1709 requires a determination by an ‘appropriate national security agency,’ rather than an Executive Branch interagency body.”

3. The Bureau Lacked the Authority to Update the List Based on the Statutorily Improper Assessment

3.公共安全与国土安全局无权依据该不符合法律规定的评估报告更新清单

Because the interagency assessment was not a qualifying national security determination, the Bureau could not rely on that assessment in adding DJI’s communications and video surveillance equipment and services to the Covered List and setting aside DJI’s existing authorizations. Congress has circumscribed the Commission’s authority over the list, making clear that updates are permitted only when there is a qualifying national security determination. The Bureau therefore exceeds its statutory authority where, as here, it updates the list based on an assessment that does not satisfy the statutory requirements.

B. The Bureau’s Reliance on the Interagency Assessment Violates DJI’s Due Process Rights

B. 公共安全与国土安全局对跨部门评估报告的依赖侵犯了大疆的正当程序权利

The Bureau’s reliance on the interagency assessment was independently improper because it violated DJI’s due process rights. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. Const. amend. V. The addition of DJI’s products to the list deprived DJI of significant liberty interests, threatening its ability to operate the business of its choice, and did so without affording DJI any procedural protections, including the ability to provide information to definitively refute the notion that DJI’s products pose any safety or security risk.

公共安全与国土安全局依据跨部门评估报告的做法本身即属不当，因其侵犯了大疆的正当程序权利。《美国宪法第五修正案》正当程序条款规定：“任何人不得……未经正当法律程序，被剥夺生命、自由或财产”《美国宪法》第五修正案。将大疆产品列入清单剥夺了大疆产品的重大自由权益，威胁其自主经营选择权，且未给予大疆任何程序性保障，包括使其无法提供信息明确反驳其产品构成任何安全风险的主张。

1. The Addition of DJI’s Products to the Covered List Deprives DJI of a Liberty Interest

1. 将大疆产品列入清单剥夺了大疆的自由权益

“The first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in ‘property’ or ‘liberty.’”  Government action deprives a corporation of that protected liberty interest when it “harm[s] [the corporation’s] reputation” and “alter[s] [the corporation’s] status in a tangible way,” broadly precluding the corporation from pursuing its chosen trade or business. 

“在每一起正当程序诉讼中，首要的审查事项是原告是否被剥夺了受‘财产’或‘自由’保护的权益。”当政府行为“损害[企业]声誉”并“以实质方式改变[企业]地位”，从而广泛阻碍该企业从事其选定的行业或业务时，即构成对该受保护自由权益的剥夺。

The listing of DJI’s products has both features. The listing plainly damages DJI’s reputation, as it purports to reflect a conclusion that DJI and its products pose an unacceptable risk of national security. That stigma threatens DJI’s ability to sell any products in the United States, not just those expressly included on the Covered List. And it threatens DJI’s ability to sell its products abroad to the extent other countries might be influenced by purported U.S. national security assessments. Finally, the listing alters DJI’s status in a formal, tangible way: DJI is now legally prohibited from marketing, selling, or importing any new “communications and video surveillance equipment and services” in the United States. And the Commission explicitly relied on the listing as authority for setting aside many of DJI’s existing equipment authorizations. DJI estimates that these actions together will cost it more than $1.5 billion.

将大疆产品列入清单的行为同时具备上述两项特征。该清单显然损害了大疆的声誉，因其意在反映了大疆及其产品构成不可接受国家安全风险的结论。这一污名化标签威胁到大疆在美国销售任何产品的能力,而不仅限于明确列入受管制清单的产品；同时，就其他国家可能受到所谓美国国家安全评估影响的范围而言,该列入清单行为也威胁到大疆在海外销售其产品的能力。最后，该清单以正式、实质的方式改变了大疆的法律地位：大疆现被依法禁止在美国营销、销售或进口任何新型“通信和视频监控设备及服务”。此外，联邦通信委员会明确依据该清单撤销了大疆多项现有设备的授权。大疆估计，这些行为合计将导致其损失超过15亿美元。

2. The Government Afforded DJI No Procedural Protections

In depriving DJI of its protected liberty interest, the government failed to afford any procedural protections, let alone procedures that “comport with due process.” Courts long have recognized that “due process”-even in the national security context- “requires, at the least, that an affected party be informed of the official action, be given access to the unclassified evidence on which the official actor relied[,] and be afforded an opportunity to rebut that evidence.” DJI was afforded none of those opportunities before its products were added to the Covered List. 

在剥夺大疆受保护的自由权益过程中，政府未提供任何程序性保障，遑论“符合正当程序”的程序。法院长期以来一直认可，“正当程序”——即使在国家安全领域——“至少要求受影响方被告知官方行为、有权获取官方行为所依据的非机密证据，并获得反驳该证据的机会”。而在其产品被列入清单前，大疆未获得任何上述机会。

3. The Bureau Cannot Add Products to the Covered List When Doing So Violates Due Process Rights

3. 公共安全与国土安全局不得在侵犯正当程序权利的情况下将产品列入清单

These fundamental flaws in the process that resulted in the deprivation of DJI’s liberty interests require the Commission to remove DJI’s communications and video surveillance equipment and services from the list and reverse the set-asides based on the listing, unless and until DJI receives the process to which it is entitled. 

鉴于剥夺大疆自由权益的程序存在上述根本性缺陷，联邦通信委员会必须将大疆的通信和视频监控设备及服务从清单中移除，并推翻基于该清单作出的授权撤销决定，除非且直至大疆获得其应享有的程序保障。

III. THE BUREAU CANNOT ADD DJI’S PRODUCTS TO THE COVERED LIST UNDER SECTION 1709(A)(2) OF THE FY2025 NDAA

III. 公共安全与国土安全局不得依据《2025财年国防授权法》第1709(a)(2)节将大疆产品列入清单

In adding DJI’s communications and video surveillance equipment and services to the Covered List, the Bureau relied exclusively on the interagency national security assessment and “subsection 1709(a)(1) of the FY2025 NDAA.” But even if the Bureau had relied on Section 1709(a)(2), or even if the Bureau sought to excuse the statutory inadequacy of the investigation by pointing to this provision, that provision would not authorize the listing of any and all of DJI’s products because it is unconstitutional.

公共安全与国土安全局将大疆的通信和视频监控设备及服务列入清单时，完全依据跨部门国家安全评估报告及《2025财年国防授权法》第1709(a)(1)节。但即便该局援引了第1709(a)(2)节，或试图以该节为由为调查的法律缺陷开脱，该条款也无法授权将大疆的所有产品列入清单，因其本身违宪。

A. Section 1709(a)(2) Violates Due Process

A. 第1709(a)(2)节违反正当程序

Section 1709(a)(2) violates DJI’s due process rights for many of the same reasons that the Bureau’s reliance on the assessment does. 

第1709(a)(2)节侵犯大疆正当程序权利的诸多理由，与公共安全与国土安全局依据涉案评估报告侵犯大疆正当程序权利的理由多有相同。

Section 1709(a)(2) affords DJI no procedural protections whatsoever in imposing these serious consequences. The provision directs that DJI’s equipment and services “shall” be added to the list “[i]f the appropriate national security agency does not make [the required national security] determination” within one year of enactment of the statute. Section 1709(a)(2) thus mandates that DJI will be added to the list-and suffer the attendant consequences-without requiring any specific determination that DJI poses a national security threat and without affording DJI any opportunity to rebut any unclassified evidence that might be used to support such a determination. That result plainly violates due process.

第1709(a)(2)节在施加上述严重后果时，未给予大疆任何程序性保障。该条款规定，“若相应国家安全机构未在本法颁布后一年内作出[所需的国家安全]认定”，大疆的设备及服务“应”被列入清单。因此，第1709(a)(2)节强制要求将大疆列入清单并使其承担相应后果，而无需作出大疆构成国家安全威胁的任何明确认定,也无需给予大疆任何机会反驳可能用于支持此类认定的任何非机密证据。这一结果显然违反正当程序。

B. Section 1709(a)(2)’s Differential Treatment of DJI Violates the Equal Protection Clause

B. 第1709(a)(2)节对大疆的差别待遇违反平等保护条款

Section 1709(a)(2) also runs afoul of the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee because it singles out DJI for disfavored treatment.Section 1709(a)(2) thus imposes a unique burden on DJI.

第1709(a)(2)节还抵触了《第五修正案》的平等保护保障，因其单独将大疆列为差别待遇对象。因此，第1709(a)(2)节对大疆施加了独特的负担。

C. Section 1709(a)(2) Is an Unconstitutional Bill of Attainder

C. 第1709(a)(2)节构成违宪的剥夺公权法案

Finally, Section 1709(a)(2) violates the Constitution’s prohibition against any “Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law.” 

最后，第1709(a)(2)节违反了宪法关于禁止制定任何“剥夺公权法案或追溯性法律”的规定。

Section 1709(a)(2) satisfies both requirements.

第1709(a)(2)节完全符合上述两要件。

Section 1709(a)(2) also imposes punishment. The “most important” inquiry in determining whether legislation imposes impermissible punishment is the “so-called functional test,” which asks “whether the statute, viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes.” “[C]ompelling proof on this score may be determinative,” even where other inquiries mark the legislation as nonpunitive.

第1709(a)(2)节还施加了惩罚性后果。判断某法律是否施加了不当惩罚的“最重要”标准是“所谓的功能测试”，即考察“从该法律所施加负担的类型和严重程度来看，是否可以合理认为其旨在实现非惩罚性的立法目的”。“如果在功能性测试上有充分的证据证明该立法具有惩罚性，该证据可能起到决定性作用”，即便其他标准显示该法律具有非惩罚性。

That functional inquiry reveals Section 1709(a)(2)’s punitive nature. The provision inflicts severe burdens, ensuring that DJI will be prevented from selling new communications and video surveillance equipment and services in the United States absent any finding that those products or DJI pose an unacceptable risk to national security. Section 1709(a)(2)’s differential treatment of DJI belies any suggestion that imposition of those burdens serves nonpunitive aims. 

该功能测试表明第1709(a)(2)节具有惩罚性。该条款施加了严重负担，在未认定大疆及其产品构成不可接受国家安全风险的情况下，禁止大疆在美国销售新型通信和视频监控设备及服务。第1709(a)(2)节对大疆的差别待遇，表明任何关于施加此类负担旨在实现非惩罚性目的的主张均不成立。

IV. AT A MINIMUM, THE BUREAU CANNOT LIST DJI PRODUCTS THAT ARE NOT COMMUNICATIONS OR VIDEO SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT

IV. 至少，公共安全与国土安全局不得将非通信或视频监控设备的大疆产品列入清单

Even if the Bureau were lawfully authorized to include DJI’s products on the Covered List (which it was not), that listing cannot include DJI products that are not communications or video surveillance equipment. Properly understood, that statutory phrase includes virtually no DJI products-and certainly does not include DJI’s non-drone products.

即便公共安全与国土安全局有权将大疆产品列入清单（事实并非如此），该清单也不得包含非通信或视频监控设备的大疆产品。正确理解而言，该法律术语实际上几乎不涵盖任何大疆产品——当然也不包括大疆的非无人机产品。

The Commission exceeds its statutory authority to the extent it interprets the December 22 Listing to cover DJI products that do not fall within these statutory definitions. But that interpretation eliminates the statutory requirement that the equipment or service be “essential” to the provision of the advanced communications service. The mere fact that the equipment or service is “used in” a broadband network does not mean that it is “essential to”-that is, necessary for-the operation of that network. DJI products clearly are not essential to broadband networks, as that term is commonly understood: no broadband network would operate any worse absent DJI’s drones and other products. The vast majority of DJI’s products, particularly non-UAS products, do not even connect directly to the Internet; instead, they rely on a connected mobile phone to transmit data.

若联邦通信委员会将《12月22日清单》解释为涵盖不符合上述法定定义的大疆产品，则其实属越权。但该解释删除了法律要求的“对提供先进通信服务至关重要”这一要件。某设备或服务“用于”宽带网络，并不意味着其对该网络的运营“至关重要”（即必不可少）。按照通常理解，大疆产品显然对宽带网络并非必不可少：即便没有大疆的无人机及其他产品，宽带网络的运行也不会受到任何负面影响。大疆的绝大多数产品（尤其是非无人机产品）甚至不直接连接互联网，而是依赖联网的移动设备传输数据。

The Commission definition of “[a]dvanced communications service” is similarly flawed. The Commission historically has defined that term to include any “high-speed, switched, broadband telecommunications capability that enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any technology with connection speeds of at least 200 kbps in either direction.” But that definition is unreasonably broad, as it would encompass almost every piece of electronic equipment that has the capability to connect to a network today, including, for example, any camera with the capability to connect to a cell phone. To the extent the Commission has suggested that a higher threshold applies in certain contexts, it has offered no reasons for that differential application, and it has failed to explain what standard it intends to apply as part of the December 22 Listing.

联邦通信委员会对“高级通信服务”的定义同样存在缺陷。该委员会历来将该术语定义为 “能够使用户通过任何技术发起和接收高质量语音、数据、图形和视频通信，且双向连接速度至少为200千比特/秒的高速、交换式宽带电信能力”。但该定义过于宽泛，几乎涵盖了当今所有具备联网能力的电子设备，例如任何可连接手机的相机。即便委员会曾暗示在特定情形下适用更高标准，也未说明采用差别适用的理由，且未解释其拟在《12月22日清单》中适用何种标准。

Categorizing DJI’s products as video surveillance equipment also fails to comply with the Commission’s own requirements for adding such equipment to the Covered List. To be added to  the Covered List, video surveillance equipment must be capable of use in a fixed or mobile  broadband network with connection speeds of at least 200 kbps in either direction. Many of DJI’s products, including some drones and most non-drones, are not independently capable of transmitting at those speeds. To the extent that the Bureau added DJI’s products to the list because it determined that they are capable of meeting the transmission speed requirements, it must state how and why that determination was made. Absent any such determination, DJI’s products cannot legally be added to the Covered List as video surveillance equipment.

将大疆产品归类为视频监控设备，同样不符合联邦通信委员会自身关于此类设备列入清单的要求。视频监控设备若要被列入清单，其必须能够在双向连接速度至少为200千比特/秒的固定或移动宽带网络中使用。大疆的许多产品（包括部分无人机和大多数非无人机产品）无法独立达到该传输速度。若公共安全与国土安全局因认定大疆产品符合传输速度要求而将其列入清单，则必须说明作出该认定的依据和理由。在缺乏此类认定的情况下，大疆产品无法作为视频监控设备合法地被列入清单。

For the foregoing reasons, DJI requests that the Commission grant the petition, rescind the addition of DJI’s communications and video surveillance equipment and services to the Covered List, and reverse the set-asides based on the listing. At a minimum, DJI requests that the Commission clarify that the listing does not apply to DJI equipment that does not satisfy the statutory definitions of communications and video surveillance equipment.

综上，大疆请求联邦通信委员会批准本申请，撤销将大疆通信和视频监控设备及服务列入清单的决定，并推翻基于该清单作出的授权撤销行为。至少，大疆请求联邦通信委员会明确，该清单不适用于不符合通信和视频监控设备法定定义的大疆产品。